Emotions (W. James)

Comparing emotions to instincts

James V. Psychology. Part II

St. Petersburg: Publishing House K.L. Rikker, 1911. S.323-340.

The difference between emotions and instincts lies in the fact that emotion is the desire for feelings, and instinct is the desire for action in the presence of a known object in the environment. But emotions also have corresponding bodily manifestations, which sometimes consist in a strong muscle contraction (for example, at a moment of fright or anger); and in many cases it may be somewhat difficult to draw a sharp line between the description of an emotional process and an instinctive reaction that can be evoked by the same object. To which chapter should the phenomenon of fear be attributed — to the chapter on instincts or to the chapter on emotions? Where should descriptions of curiosity, competition, etc. also be placed? From a scientific point of view, this is indifferent, therefore, we must be guided by practical considerations alone to resolve this issue. As purely internal states of mind, emotions are completely beyond description. In addition, such a description would be superfluous, since emotions, as purely mental states, are already well known to the reader. We can only describe their relation to the objects that call them and the reactions that accompany them. Every object that affects some instinct is capable of evoking an emotion in us. The whole difference here lies in the fact that the so-called emotional reaction does not go beyond the body of the subject being tested, but the so-called instinctive reaction can go further and enter into a mutual relationship in practice with the object that causes it. In both instinctive and emotional processes, a mere recollection of a given object or an image of it may be sufficient to trigger a reaction. A man may even become more enraged at the thought of the insult inflicted on him than by directly experiencing it, and after the death of the mother may have more tenderness for her than during her life. Throughout this chapter, I will use the expression «object of emotion», applying it indifferently both to the case when this object is an existing real object, as well as to the case when such an object is simply a reproduced representation.

The variety of emotions is infinite

Anger, fear, love, hatred, joy, sadness, shame, pride, and various shades of these emotions can be called the most extreme forms of emotions, being closely associated with relatively strong bodily excitement. More refined emotions are the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic feelings, with which much less intense bodily excitations are usually associated. The objects of emotions can be described endlessly. The countless shades of each of them imperceptibly pass one into the other and are partly marked in the language by synonyms, such as hatred, antipathy, enmity, anger, dislike, disgust, vindictiveness, hostility, disgust, etc. The difference between them is established in the dictionaries of synonyms and in psychology courses; in many German manuals on psychology, the chapters on emotions are simply dictionaries of synonyms. But there are certain limits to the fruitful elaboration of what is already self-evident, and the result of many works in this direction is that the purely descriptive literature on this subject from Descartes to the present day represents the most boring branch of psychology. Moreover, you feel in studying him that the subdivisions of emotions proposed by psychologists are, in the vast majority of cases, mere fictions or very significant, and that their claims to the accuracy of terminology are completely unfounded. But, unfortunately, the vast majority of psychological research on emotion is purely descriptive. In novels, we read the description of emotions, being created in order to experience them for ourselves. In them we get acquainted with objects and circumstances that evoke emotions, and therefore every subtle feature of self-observation that adorns this or that page of the novel immediately finds in us an echo of feeling. Classical literary and philosophical works, written in the form of a series of aphorisms, also shed light on our emotional life and, exciting our feelings, give us pleasure. As for the «scientific psychology» of feeling, I must have spoiled my taste by reading too much of the classics on the subject. But I would rather read verbal descriptions of the size of the rocks in New Hampshire than re-read these psychological works again. There is no fruitful guiding principle in them, no main point of view. Emotions vary and are shaded in them ad infinitum, but you will not find any logical generalizations in them. Meanwhile, the whole charm of truly scientific work lies in the constant deepening of logical analysis. Is it really impossible to rise above the level of concrete descriptions in the analysis of emotions? I think that there is a way out of the realm of such specific descriptions, it is only worth making an effort to find it.

The reason for the diversity of emotions

The difficulties that arise in psychology in the analysis of emotions arise, it seems to me, from the fact that they are too accustomed to consider them as absolutely separate phenomena from each other. As long as we consider each of them as some kind of eternal, inviolable spiritual entity, like the species once considered in biology to be immutable entities, until then we can only reverently catalog the various features of emotions, their degrees and the actions caused by them. But if we consider them as products of more general causes (as, for example, in biology, the difference of species is considered as a product of variability under the influence of environmental conditions and the transmission of acquired changes through heredity), then the establishment of differences and classification will become mere auxiliary means. If we already have a goose that lays golden eggs, then describing each laid egg individually is a matter of secondary importance. In the few pages that follow, I, limiting myself at first to the so-called gu.e.mi forms of emotions, will point out one cause of emotions — a cause of a very general nature.

Feeling in gu.e.x forms of emotions is the result of its bodily manifestations

It is customary to think that in the higher forms of emotion, the psychic impression received from a given object evokes in us a state of mind called emotion, and the latter entails a certain bodily manifestation. According to my theory, on the contrary, bodily excitement immediately follows the perception of the fact that caused it, and our awareness of this excitement while it is happening is emotion. It is customary to express ourselves as follows: we have lost our fortune, we are distressed and weep; we met a bear, we are frightened and take flight; we are insulted by the enemy, enraged and strike him. According to the hypothesis I defend, the order of these events should be somewhat different — namely: the first mental state is not immediately replaced by the second, there must be bodily manifestations between them, and therefore it is most rationally expressed as follows: we are sad because we cry; enraged because we beat another; we are afraid because we tremble, and not to say: we cry, beat, tremble, because we are saddened, enraged, frightened. If bodily manifestations did not immediately follow perception, then the latter would be in its form a purely cognitive act, pale, devoid of color and emotional «warmth». We might then see the bear and decide that the best thing to do would be to take flight, we might be insulted and find it just to repel the blow, but we would not feel fear or indignation at the same time.

A hypothesis expressed in such a bold form can immediately give rise to doubts. And meanwhile, in order to belittle its apparently paradoxical character and, perhaps, even to be convinced of its truth, there is no need to resort to numerous and distant considerations.

First of all, let us pay attention to the fact that each perception, through a certain kind of physical effect, has a widespread effect on our body, preceding the emergence in us of an emotion or an emotional image. Listening to a poem, a drama, a heroic story, we often notice with surprise that a trembling suddenly runs through our body, like a wave, or that our heart began to beat faster, and tears suddenly poured from our eyes. The same thing is observed in an even more tangible form when listening to music. If, while walking in the forest, we suddenly notice something dark, moving, our heart starts to beat, and we instantly hold our breath, without having yet had time to form any definite idea of ​​danger in our head. If our good friend comes close to the edge of the abyss, we begin to feel the well-known feeling of unease and step back, although we know well that he is out of danger and have no distinct idea of ​​his fall. The author vividly remembers his surprise when, as a 7-8-year-old boy, he once fainted at the sight of blood, which, after a bloodletting performed on a horse, was in a bucket. There was a stick in this bucket, he began to stir with this stick the liquid that dripped from the stick into the bucket, and he experienced nothing but childish curiosity. Suddenly the light dimmed in his eyes, there was a buzz in his ears, and he lost consciousness. He had never heard before that the sight of blood could cause nausea and fainting in people, and he felt so little disgust for it and saw so little danger in it that even at such a tender age he could not help but be surprised at how the mere presence of a bucket red liquid can have such an amazing effect on the body.

The best evidence that the direct cause of emotions is the physical action of external stimuli on the nerves is provided by those pathological cases in which there is no corresponding object for emotions. One of the main advantages of my view of emotions is that by means of it we can bring both pathological and normal cases of emotion under one general scheme. In every lunatic asylum we find examples of unmotivated anger, fear, melancholy or daydreaming, as well as examples of equally unmotivated apathy that persists in spite of the decided absence of any external motives. In the first case, we must assume that the nervous mechanism has become so receptive to certain emotions that almost any stimulus, even the most unsuitable one, is a sufficient reason to arouse in it an excitation in this direction and thereby give rise to a peculiar complex of feelings that constitutes this emotion. So, for example, if a well-known person simultaneously experiences an inability to breathe deeply, palpitations, a peculiar change in the functions of the pneumogastric nerve, called «cardiac anguish», the desire to assume a motionless prostrate position, and, moreover, still other unexplored processes in the entrails, the general combination of these phenomena generates in him a feeling of fear, and he becomes a victim of a death fright well known to some.

A friend of mine, who happened to experience attacks of this most terrible disease, told me that his heart and respiratory apparatus were the center of mental suffering; that his main effort to overcome the attack was to control his breathing and slow his heartbeat, and that his fear disappeared as soon as he could begin to breathe deeply and straighten up.

Here emotion is simply a sensation of a bodily state and is caused by a purely physiological process.

Further, let us pay attention to the fact that any bodily change, whatever it may be, is clearly or vaguely felt by us at the moment of its appearance. If the reader has not yet happened to pay attention to this circumstance, then he may notice with interest and surprise how many sensations in various parts of the body are characteristic signs that accompany one or another emotional state of his spirit. There is no reason to expect that the reader, for the sake of such a curious psychological analysis, will delay in himself impulses of captivating passion by self-observation, but he can observe the emotions that occur in him in calmer states of mind, and conclusions that will be valid regarding weak degrees of emotions can be extended to the same emotions with greater intensity. In the entire volume occupied by our body, during emotion, we experience very vividly heterogeneous sensations, from each part of it various sensory impressions penetrate into consciousness, from which the feeling of personality is composed, constantly conscious of each person. It is amazing what insignificant occasions these complexes of feelings often evoke in our minds. Being even in the slightest degree upset by something, we can notice that our mental state is always physiologically expressed mainly by the contraction of the eyes and the muscles of the eyebrows. With unexpected difficulty, we begin to experience some kind of awkwardness in the throat, which makes us take a sip, clear our throat or cough lightly; similar phenomena are observed in many other cases. Due to the variety of combinations in which these organic changes accompanying emotions occur, it can be said, on the basis of abstract considerations, that every shade in its whole has for itself a special physiological manifestation, which is as unicum as the very shade of emotion. The huge number of individual parts of the body that undergo modification during a given emotion makes it so difficult for a person in a calm state to reproduce the external manifestations of any emotion. We can reproduce the play of the muscles of voluntary movement corresponding to a given emotion, but we cannot voluntarily bring about the proper stimulation in the skin, glands, heart, and viscera. Just as an artificial sneeze lacks something compared to a real sneeze, so does the artificial reproduction of sadness or enthusiasm in the absence of proper occasions for the corresponding moods not produce a complete illusion.

Now I want to proceed to the presentation of the most important point of my theory, which is this: if we imagine some strong emotion and try to mentally subtract from this state of our consciousness, one by one, all the sensations of the bodily symptoms associated with it, then in the end there will be nothing left of this emotion, no “psychic material” from which this emotion could be formed. The result is a cold, indifferent state of purely intellectual perception. Most of the persons whom I asked to verify my position by self-observation fully agreed with me, but some stubbornly continued to maintain that their self-observation did not justify my hypothesis. Many people just can’t understand the question itself. For example, you ask them to remove from consciousness any feeling of laughter and any inclination to laugh at the sight of a funny object and then say what the funny side of this object will then consist in, whether then a simple perception of an object belonging to the class of “ridiculous” will not remain in consciousness; to this they stubbornly reply that it is physically impossible and that they are always compelled to laugh when they see a funny object. Meanwhile, the task that I proposed to them was not to, looking at a funny object, actually destroy in themselves any desire for laughter. This is a task of a purely speculative nature, and consists in the mental elimination of certain sensible elements from the emotional state taken as a whole, and in determining what the residual elements would be in such a case. I cannot rid myself of the thought that anyone who clearly understands the question I have posed will agree with the proposition I have stated above.

I absolutely cannot imagine what kind of emotion of fear will remain in our mind if we eliminate from it the feelings associated with an increased heartbeat, short breathing, trembling lips, relaxation of the limbs, goose bumps and excitement in the insides. Can anyone imagine a state of anger and at the same time imagine not the excitement in the chest, the rush of blood to the face, the expansion of the nostrils, the clenching of the teeth and the desire for energetic deeds, but on the contrary: the muscles in a relaxed state, even breathing and a calm face. The author, at least, certainly cannot do this. In this case, in his opinion, anger should be completely absent as a feeling associated with certain external manifestations, and one can assume. that what is left is only a calm, dispassionate judgment, which belongs entirely to the intellectual realm, namely, the idea that a well-known person or persons deserve punishment for their sins. The same reasoning applies to the emotion of sadness: what would sadness be without tears, sobs, delayed heartbeat, longing in the stomach? Deprived of sensual tone, the recognition of the fact that certain circumstances are very sad — and nothing more. The same is found in the analysis of every other passion. Human emotion, devoid of any bodily lining, is one empty sound. I am not saying that such an emotion is something contrary to the nature of things and that pure spirits are condemned to a passionless intellectual existence. I only want to say that for us emotion, detached from all bodily sensations, is something unimaginable. The more I analyze my states of mind, the more I become convinced that the «gu.e.e» passions and enthusiasms that I experience are essentially created and caused by those bodily changes that we usually call their manifestations or results. And all the more it begins to seem probable to me that if my organism becomes anesthetic (insensitive), the life of affects, both pleasant and unpleasant, will become completely alien to me and I will have to drag out an existence of a purely cognitive or intellectual character. Although such an existence seemed to be the ideal for the ancient sages, but for us, separated only by a few generations from the philosophical era that brought sensuality to the fore, it must seem too apathetic, lifeless, to be worth so stubbornly striving for.

My point of view cannot be called materialistic

There is no more and no less materialism in it than in any view according to which our emotions are caused by nervous processes. None of the readers of my book will be indignant against this proposition as long as it remains stated in a general form, and if anyone nevertheless sees materialism in this proposition, then only with this or that particular types of emotions in mind. Emotions are sensory processes that are caused by internal nerve currents that arise under the influence of external stimuli. Such processes, however, have always been considered by Platonizing psychologists as phenomena associated with something extremely base. But, whatever the physiological conditions for the formation of our emotions, in themselves, as mental phenomena, they must still remain what they are. If they are deep, pure, valuable psychic facts, then from the point of view of any physiological theory of their origin they will remain the same deep, pure, valuable for us in meaning as they are from the point of view of our theory. They conclude for themselves the inner measure of their significance, and to prove, with the help of the proposed theory of emotions, that sensory processes must not necessarily be distinguished by a base, material character, is just as logically inconsistent as to refute the proposed theory, referring to the fact that it leads to a base materialistic interpretation. phenomena of emotion.

The proposed point of view explains the amazing variety of emotions

If the theory I propose is correct, then each emotion is the result of a combination into one complex of mental elements, each of which is due to a certain physiological process. The constituent elements that make up any change in the body are the result of a reflex caused by an external stimulus. This immediately raises a number of quite definite questions, which differ sharply from any questions proposed by representatives of other theories of emotions. From their point of view, the only possible tasks in the analysis of emotion were the classification: “To what genus or species does this emotion belong?” or description: “What external manifestations characterize this emotion?”. Now it’s a matter of finding out the causes of emotions: “What modifications does this or that object cause in us?” and «Why does it cause in us those and not other modifications?». From a superficial analysis of emotions, we thus move on to a deeper study, to a study of a higher order. Classification and description are the lowest stages in the development of science. As soon as the question of causation enters the scene in a given scientific field of study, classification and descriptions recede into the background and retain their significance only in so far as they facilitate the study of causality for us. Once we have clarified that the cause of emotions are countless reflex acts that arise under the influence of external objects and are immediately conscious of us, then it immediately becomes clear to us why there can be countless emotions and why in individual individuals they can vary indefinitely both in composition and in the motives that give rise to them. The fact is that in the reflex act there is nothing immutable, absolute. Very different actions of the reflex are possible, and these actions, as is known, vary to infinity.

In short: any classification of emotions can be considered «true» or «natural» as long as it serves its purpose, and questions like «What is the ‘true’ or ‘typical’ expression of anger and fear?» have no objective value. Instead of solving such questions, we should be occupied with clarifying how this or that “expression” of fear or anger could occur — and this is, on the one hand, the task of physiological mechanics, on the other, the task of the history of the human psyche, a task that, like all scientific problems are essentially solvable, although it is difficult, perhaps, to find its solution. A little lower I will give the attempts that were made to solve it.

Additional evidence in favor of my theory

If my theory is correct, then it should be confirmed by the following indirect evidence: according to it, by evoking in ourselves arbitrarily, in a calm state of mind, the so-called external manifestations of this or that emotion, we must experience the emotion itself. This assumption, as far as it could be verified by experience, is more likely confirmed than refuted by the latter. Everyone knows to what extent flight intensifies the panic feeling of fear in us and how it is possible to increase feelings of anger or sadness in ourselves by giving free rein to their external manifestations. By resuming sobbing, we intensify the feeling of grief in ourselves, and each new attack of weeping further increases grief, until finally there is calm due to fatigue and a visible weakening of physical excitement. Everyone knows how in anger we bring ourselves to the highest point of excitement, reproducing several times in a row the outward manifestations of anger. Suppress the external manifestation of passion in yourself, and it will freeze in you. Before you give in to a tantrum, try counting to ten, and the reason for anger will seem ridiculously insignificant to you. To give ourselves courage, we whistle, and by doing so we really give ourselves confidence. On the other hand, try to sit all day in a thoughtful pose, sighing every minute and answering the questions of others with a fallen voice, and you will further strengthen your melancholic mood. In moral education, all experienced people have recognized the following rule as extremely important: if we want to suppress an undesirable emotional attraction in ourselves, we must patiently and at first calmly reproduce on ourselves external movements corresponding to the opposite spiritual moods that are desirable for us. The result of our persistent efforts in this direction will be that the evil, depressed state of mind will disappear and be replaced by a joyful and meek mood. Straighten the wrinkles on your forehead, clear your eyes, straighten your body, speak in a major tone, cheerfully greeting your acquaintances, and if you do not have a heart of stone, then you will involuntarily succumb little by little to a benevolent mood.

Against the above, one can cite the fact that, according to many actors who perfectly reproduce the external manifestations of emotions with their voice, facial expressions and body movements, they do not experience any emotions. Others, however, according to the testimony of Dr. Archer, who has collected curious statistics on the subject among actors, maintain that in those cases when they managed to play a role well, they experienced all the emotions corresponding to the latter. One can point to a very simple explanation for this disagreement between the artists. In the expression of each emotion, internal organic excitation can be completely suppressed in some individuals, and at the same time, to a large extent, the emotion itself, while other individuals do not have this ability. Actors who experience emotions while acting are incapable; those who do not experience emotions are able to completely dissociate emotions and their expression.

Answer to a possible objection

It may be objected to my theory that sometimes, by delaying the manifestation of an emotion, we strengthen it. That state of mind that you experience when circumstances force you to refrain from laughing is painful; anger, suppressed by fear, turns into the strongest hatred. On the contrary, the free expression of emotions gives relief.

This objection is more apparent than actually substantiated. During expression, emotion is always felt. After expression, when a normal discharge has taken place in the nerve centers, we no longer experience emotions. But even in cases where expression in facial expressions is suppressed by us, internal excitation in the chest and stomach can manifest itself with all the greater force, as, for example, with suppressed laughter; or the emotion, through the combination of the object that evokes it with the influence that restrains it, may be reborn into an entirely different emotion, which may be accompanied by a different and stronger organic excitation. If I had the desire to kill my enemy, but did not dare to do so, then my emotion would be completely different from that which would take possession of me if I had carried out my desire. In general, this objection is untenable.

More subtle emotions

In aesthetic emotions, bodily excitement and intensity of sensations can be weak. The esthetician can calmly, without any bodily excitement, in a purely intellectual way evaluate a work of art. On the other hand, works of art can evoke extremely strong emotions, and in these cases the experience is quite in harmony with the theoretical propositions we have put forward. According to our theory, the main sources of emotions are centripetal currents. In aesthetic perceptions (for example, musical ones), centripetal currents play the main role, regardless of whether internal organic excitations arise along with them or not. The aesthetic work itself represents the object of sensation, and since aesthetic perception is the object of immediate, «gu.e.go», a vividly experienced sensation, insofar as the aesthetic pleasure associated with it is «gu.e.» and bright. I do not deny the fact that there may be subtle pleasures, in other words, there may be emotions due solely to the excitation of the centers, quite independently of centripetal currents. Such feelings include the feeling of moral satisfaction, gratitude, curiosity, relief after solving the problem. But the weakness and pallor of these feelings, when they are not connected with bodily excitations, is a very sharp contrast to the more intense emotions. In all persons endowed with sensitivity and impressionability, subtle emotions have always been associated with bodily excitement: moral justice is reflected in the sounds of the voice or in the expression of the eyes, etc. What we call admiration is always associated with bodily excitement, even if the motives that caused it were of a purely intellectual nature. If a clever demonstration or a brilliant wit does not cause us real laughter, if we do not experience bodily excitement at the sight of a just or generous act, then our state of mind can hardly be called an emotion. De facto, here there is simply an intellectual perception of phenomena that we refer to the group of dexterous, witty or fair, generous, etc. Such states of consciousness, which include a simple judgment, should be attributed to cognitive rather than emotional mental processes.

Description of fear

On the basis of the considerations I have made above, I will not give here any inventory of emotions, no classification of them, and no description of their symptoms. Almost all of this the reader can deduce for himself from self-observation and observation of others. However, as an example of a better description of the symptoms of emotion, I will give here a Darwinian description of the symptoms of fear:

“Fear is often preceded by astonishment and is so closely associated with it that both of them immediately have an effect on the senses of sight and hearing. In both cases, the eyes and mouth open wide, and the eyebrows rise. A frightened person in the first minute stops in his tracks, holding his breath and remaining motionless, or bends down to the ground, as if trying instinctively to remain unnoticed. The heart beats rapidly, hitting the ribs with force, although it is extremely doubtful that it worked more intensively than usual, sending a greater than usual flow of blood to all parts of the body, since the skin instantly turns pale, as before the onset of a faint. We can see that the feeling of intense fear has a significant effect on the skin, by noticing the amazing instantaneous sweating. This perspiration is all the more remarkable because the surface of the skin is cold (hence the expression: cold sweat), while the surface of the skin is hot during normal perspiration from the sweat glands. The hairs on the skin stand on end, and the muscles begin to tremble. In connection with the violation of the normal order in the activity of the heart, breathing becomes rapid. The salivary glands cease to function properly, the mouth dries up and often opens and closes again. I also noticed that with a slight fright there is a strong desire to yawn. One of the most characteristic symptoms of fear is the trembling of all the muscles of the body, often it is first noticed on the lips. As a result of this, and also due to dryness of the mouth, the voice becomes hoarse, deaf, and sometimes completely disappears. «Obstupui steteruntque comae et vox faucibus haesi — I am numb; my hair stood on end, and my voice died in the larynx (lat.) «…

When fear rises to the agony of terror, we get a new picture of emotional reactions. The heart beats completely erratically, stops, and fainting occurs; the face is covered with deathly pallor; breathing is difficult, the wings of the nostrils are widely parted, the lips move convulsively, as in a person who is suffocating, the sunken cheeks tremble, swallowing and inhalation occur in the throat, bulging eyes, almost not covered with eyelids, are fixed on the object of fear or constantly rotate from side to side. «Huc illuc volvens oculos totumque pererra — Rotating from side to side, the eye circles the whole (lat.)». The pupils are said to be disproportionately dilated. All the muscles stiffen or come into convulsive movements, the fists are alternately clenched, then unclenched, often these movements are convulsive. Hands are either extended forward, or may randomly cover the head. Mr. Haguenauer saw this last gesture from the frightened Australian. In other cases, there is a sudden irresistible urge to flee, this urge is so strong that the bravest soldiers can be seized with sudden panic (Origin of the Emotions (NY Ed.), p. 292.).

Origin of emotional reactions

In what way do the various objects that evoke emotion give rise in us to certain kinds of bodily excitation? This question has only been raised very recently, but interesting attempts have been made since then to answer it.

Some of the expressions may be regarded as a weak repetition of movements which were formerly (when they were still expressed in a sharper form) beneficial to the individual. Other types of expression can similarly be considered a reproduction in a weak form of movements that, under other conditions, were necessary physiological additions to useful movements. An example of such emotional reactions is the shortness of breath during anger or fear, which is, so to speak, an organic echo, an incomplete reproduction of the state when a person had to breathe really hard in a fight with an enemy or in a swift flight. Such, at least, are Spencer’s guesses on the subject, guesses that have been confirmed by other scientists. He was also, to my knowledge, the first scientist to suggest that other movements in fear and anger could be regarded as vestigial remnants of movements that were originally useful.

“To experience in a mild degree,” he says, “the mental states that accompany getting wounded or running away is to feel what we call fear. To experience, to a lesser extent, the states of mind associated with grasping prey, killing and eating it, is like wanting to seize prey, kill and eat it. The only language of our inclinations serves as proof that the inclinations to certain actions are nothing but the nascent psychic excitations associated with these actions. Strong fear is expressed by a cry, a desire to escape, heart trembling, trembling — in a word, symptoms that accompany actual suffering experienced from an object that inspires us with fear. The passions associated with destruction, the annihilation of something, are expressed in the general tension of the muscular system, in gnashing of teeth, releasing claws, widening eyes and snorting — all these are weak manifestations of those actions that accompany the killing of prey. To these objective data anyone can add many facts from personal experience, the meaning of which is also clear. Everyone can see for himself that the state of mind caused by fear consists in the representation of some unpleasant phenomena that await us ahead; and that the state of mind called anger consists in imagining actions connected with inflicting suffering on someone.

The principle of experience in a weak form of reactions, useful for us in a sharper collision with the object of a given emotion, has found many applications in experience. Such a small feature as baring teeth, exposing the upper teeth, are considered by Darwin as something inherited by us from our ancestors, who had large eye teeth (fangs) and bared them when attacking the enemy (as dogs do now). In the same way, according to Darwin, the lifting of the eyebrows in directing attention to something external, the opening of the mouth in amazement, are due to the usefulness of these movements in extreme cases. The raising of the eyebrows is connected with the opening of the eyes to see better, the opening of the mouth with intense listening and with the rapid inhalation of air, which usually precedes muscular tension. According to Spencer, the expansion of the nostrils in anger is a remnant of those actions that our ancestors resorted to, inhaling air through the nose during the struggle, when «their mouth was filled with a part of the body of the enemy, which they captured with their teeth» (!). Trembling during fear, according to Mantegazza, has its purpose in warming up the blood (!). Wundt believes that the redness of the face and neck is a process designed to balance the pressure on the brain of blood rushing to the head due to sudden excitation of the heart. Wundt and Darwin argue that the outpouring of tears has the same purpose: by causing a rush of blood to the face, they divert it from the brain. The contraction of the muscles about the eyes, which in childhood is intended to protect the eye from excessive rush of blood during fits of screaming in the child, is preserved in adults in the form of a frown of the eyebrows, which always occurs immediately when we come across something in thinking or activity. unpleasant or difficult. “Since the habit of frowning before every fit of screaming or crying has been maintained in children for countless generations,” says Darwin, “it has been strongly associated with a sense of the onset of something disastrous or unpleasant. Then, under similar conditions, it arose in adulthood, although it never reached a fit of crying. Crying and crying we begin to voluntarily suppress in the early period of life, but the tendency to frown can hardly ever be unlearned. Another principle, to which Darwin may not do justice, may be called the principle of responding similarly to similar sensory stimuli. There are a number of adjectives which we metaphorically apply to impressions belonging to different sense-regions—the sense-impressions of every class may be sweet, rich, and enduring, the sensations of all classes may be sharp. Accordingly, Wundt and Piderith regard many of the most expressive reactions to moral motives as symbolically used expressions of taste impressions. Our attitude to sensory impressions, which have an analogy with the sensations of sweet, bitter, sour, is expressed in movements similar to those with which we convey the corresponding taste impressions: , representing an analogy with the expression of the corresponding taste impressions. The same similar facial expressions are observed in expressions of disgust and contentment. The expression of disgust is the initial movement for the eruption of vomiting; the expression of contentment is similar to the smile of a person sucking something sweet or tasting something with his lips. The habitual gesture of denial among us, the turning of the head from side to side about its axis, is a remnant of that movement that is usually made by children in order to prevent something unpleasant from entering their mouth, and which can be constantly observed in the nursery. It arises in us when even the simple idea of ​​something unfavorable is a stimulus. Similarly, the affirmative nodding of the head is analogous to bending down the head to eat. In women, the analogy between the movements, quite definitely initially associated with smelling and the expression of moral and social contempt and antipathy, is so obvious that it does not require explanation. In surprise and fright, we blink, even if there is no danger to our eyes; averting one’s eyes for a moment can serve as a quite reliable symptom that our offer was not to the taste of this person and we are expected to be refused. These examples will suffice to show that such movements are expressive by analogy. But if some of our emotional reactions can be explained with the help of the two principles we have indicated (and the reader has probably already had the opportunity to see how problematic and artificial the explanation of very many cases is), then there still remain many emotional reactions that do not at all cannot be explained and must be considered by us at the present time as purely idiopathic reactions to external stimuli. These include: peculiar phenomena occurring in the viscera and internal glands, dryness of the mouth, diarrhea and vomiting with great fear, copious excretion of urine when the blood is excited and contraction of the bladder with fright, yawning when waiting, a feeling of «a lump in the throat» with great sadness, tickling in the throat and increased swallowing in difficult situations, «heartache» in fear, cold and hot local and general sweating of the skin, redness of the skin, as well as some other symptoms, which, although they exist, are probably not yet clearly distinguished from among others and have not yet received a special name. According to Spencer and Mantegazza, the trembling observed not only with fear, but also with many other excitations, is a purely pathological phenomenon. These are other strong symptoms of horror — they are harmful to the being experiencing them. In an organism as complex as the nervous system, there must be many accidental reactions; these reactions could not have developed completely independently due to the mere utility they could provide to the organism. Seasickness, ticklishness, shyness, love of music, inclination to various intoxicating drinks must have arisen by chance.