Understanding the emotions of another person (E.P. Ilyin)

Understanding the emotions of another person is important for the process of communication between people both in everyday life and in professions such as «man-to-man». In addition, visual monitoring of the emotional state of a person in the course of his professional activities allows him to take timely measures to regulate his condition, which reduces injuries at work and increases labor productivity (Zinchenko, 1983).

9.1. Understanding the emotions of others and emotional abilities

The question of the genesis of the ability (or a whole range of abilities) to understand the emotions of another is largely debatable. There is evidence that as early as nine minutes after birth, a baby can recognize stimuli that schematically resemble a face (Freedman, 1974). On the other hand, it has been shown that the more mothers discuss their emotional states with three-year-old children, the better they are at the age of six at recognizing the emotional manifestations of unfamiliar adults (Dunn et al., 1991).

As noted by N. N. Danilova (2000), from an evolutionary point of view, the external expression of emotions would be useless if people could not decode these signals and, therefore, understand and adequately respond to them. Therefore, a person must have a special their decoding mechanism. The mechanism for decoding expressive information must be able to differentiate patterns of facial expression, as well as identify them as signals of certain emotional states.

This mechanism was investigated by the Swedish scientist W. Dimberg (Dimberg, 1988). He found that facial expression, depending on the sign of emotion, has a different effect on the emotional state and conditioned reflex reactions of fear in partners. It is important that facial expression can affect the subconscious level, when a person is not aware of the event and the fact of its impact.

Dimberg proved that the influence of facial expression on the magnitude of the conditioned vegetative defensive reaction is carried out automatically and does not depend on the processes of consciousness.

Facial patterns are especially powerful for people who exhibit social fear. When perceiving photographs, they enhance the signs of negative emotions and weaken the signs of positive emotions.

Obviously, the understanding of the facial patterns of various emotions is facilitated by the fact that the reaction to the partner’s facial expression is associated with the reproduction of his facial expressions, i.e., in an involuntary change in the activity of the muscles of his face. This process is similar to «emotional contagion, or resonance.» Thus, to recognize and identify patterns of facial expression, a person uses two channels — visual, which produces recognition with the gnostic neurons of the inferotemporal cortex, and proprioceptive, evaluating patterns of one’s own facial expression and serving as feedback (reinforcement) of the reaction to information from the visual channel.

Since it is often difficult to prove that humans have innate emotion recognition mechanisms, scientists are turning to studying this ability in animals. A number of studies have shown that the recognition of the emotional state of their relatives is carried out by animals instinctively. When a female mammal gives birth for the first time, she «knows» the meaning of the cries that express some kind of suffering in her offspring. N. Tinbergen (Tinbergen, 1951) studied the reactions of several species of birds reared in isolation to the silhouette shown in the figure. When the silhouette moved to the left, so that it looked like a hawk with a short neck and a long tail, it stimulated the fear response and flight of the experimental birds. When moving to the right side, the silhouette looked like a goose harmless to birds with a long neck and did not cause any fear. In a state of immobility, this silhouette did not cause any reaction in the birds. The fact that the test birds never encountered a hawk or with a goose, indicates an innate mechanism for recognizing an emotionally significant visual stimulus for them.

Despite these data, some scientists believe that the ability to recognize emotions even by facial expression is not given to a person from birth. It is known that young children inadequately perceive the emotions of others. This ability develops in the process of personality formation, but not equally in relation to different emotions. Horror is most easily recognized, followed by disgust and surprise in descending order. Therefore, the understanding of emotions must be learned. This leads a number of scientists to the idea that there is a special kind of intelligence — emotional.

Emotional intelligence

G. G. Garskova (1999) writes that the concept of «emotional intelligence» was introduced into scientific use recently by Mayer and P. Salovey (Mayer, Salovey, 1990) and became widespread in English literature thanks to the works of D. Goleman. For the introduction of this concept, two reasons were used: the heterogeneity of the concept of «intelligence» and the performance of intellectual operations with emotions. According to P. Salovey, «emotional intelligence» includes a number of abilities: recognizing one’s own emotions, mastering emotions, understanding the emotions of other people, and even self-motivation.

Criticism of this concept is based on the fact that in the concept of emotional intelligence, emotions are replaced by intelligence. According to GG Gorskova (1999), this criticism is not justified. She refers to the fact that emotions reflect a person’s attitude to various spheres of life and to himself, and the intellect just serves to understand these relationships. Therefore, emotions can be the object of intellectual operations. These operations are carried out in the form of verbalization of emotions based on their awareness and differentiation. Thus, according to Gorskova, emotional intelligence is the ability to understand the relationship of a person, represented in emotions, and manage the emotional sphere based on intellectual analysis and synthesis.

A necessary condition for emotional intelligence, as the author writes further, is the understanding of emotions by the subject. The end product of emotional intelligence is decision-making based on the reflection and understanding of emotions, which are a differentiated assessment of events that have personal meaning. Emotional intelligence produces non-obvious ways of activity to achieve goals and satisfy needs. Unlike abstract and concrete intelligence, which reflect the patterns of the external world, emotional intelligence reflects the inner world and its connections with the behavior of the individual and interaction with reality.

It seems to me that by emotional intelligence the authors mean emotional-intellectual activity.

T. Ribot devoted a special work (1895) to emotional (affective) memory, in which he defended its existence using a variety of arguments: psychological, physiological, pathological, etc. I will cite these arguments as they are retold by P. P. Blonsky.

“The only criterion that makes it possible to legitimately affirm the existence of an affective memory is that it can be recognized, that it bears the mark of already experienced, already re-felt, and that, therefore, it can be localized in the past tense.” But don’t we compare our present feelings with the past? It is said that love is not experienced twice in the same way, but «how could one know this if there were no affective traces left in the memory.» «There is no regret without comparison,» but «the law of contrast that prevails in the life of the senses presupposes an affective memory.»

“In every complex constituting a memory, the affective element is first, at first vague, vague, only with some general label: sad or joyful, terrifying or aggressive. Little by little it is determined by the appearance of intellectual images and reaches a finished form. In these memoirs, «the affective past is resurrected and recognized before the objective past, which is an appendage.»

From a physiological point of view, it is improbable that reproduction concerns only images, that is, that only those nervous processes that correspond to the reproduction of images participate in it, and the rest, in particular those related to feelings, do not participate: memory seeks to restore the entire complex of the past , the law of reintegration dominates in the field of memory, and the denial of affective memory contradicts this law. “Nervous processes that once took part in the now resurgent physiological complex and correspond to affective states … also tend to be involved in rebirth, therefore, excite affective memory.” Of course, one must be aware that «an affective image is not the same as, for example, a visual image» (1979, pp. 160-161).

Emotional memory

The question of the presence of emotional memory is also discussed. The discussion was started by T. Ribot, who showed two ways of reproducing emotions: an affective state is evoked either through intellectual states (remembering a situation, an object with which an emotion was associated in the past), or with the direct impact of a stimulus, after which it is updated in memory emotional situations. Theoretically, it could be. However, as V. K. Vilyunas (1990) notes, it is difficult to determine which of these options occurs in each specific case, and apparently impossible in a real stream of consciousness.

In addition, Ribot singled out “false” affective memory, when the subject purely intellectually recalls that in a given situation he experienced some kind of emotion, but does not experience this emotion itself. This is observed, for example, when remembering long past hobbies.

After the appearance of Ribot’s work, numerous controversies arose, to the point that the existence of emotional memory was generally questioned. Those who denied it pointed out that when we remember a pleasant, interesting, terrible, etc. event, then the memory is an image or thought, and not a feeling (emotion), i.e., an intellectual process. And it is precisely this intellectual recollection of the past that evokes in us this or that emotion, which, therefore, is not a reproduction of the former emotion, but an entirely new emotion. The old emotion is not reproduced. At the same time, supporters of the latter point of view have narrowed the problem to arbitrary reproduction of emotional experiences, although it is obvious that not only involuntary memorization of emotions is possible, but also their involuntary reproduction (Blonsky, 1935; Gromova, 1980). P. P. Blonsky, for example, writes that in his life he twice experienced what he had already seen (this effect was called “déjà vu”). At the same time, the second experience was not for him an intellectual knowledge that he had already seen this situation. For him, it was a deep, sad and pleasant feeling of a long and well-known something that he could not remember, but that felt familiar.

As Blonsky notes, the difference between an emotion experienced for the first time and a reproduced one is not only in the intensity of the experience (the emotion represented is weaker), but also in its quality. In a number of cases, a less differentiated, more primitive emotional experience is aroused. The author does not indicate specifically what kind of experience this is, however, it can be assumed that it is the emotional tone of sensations, since the persons interviewed by Blonsky noted the occurrence of a pleasant or unpleasant experience during playback and nothing more.

At the same time, Blonsky comes to the conclusion that the arbitrary reproduction of feelings (emotions) is almost impossible, at least for many. And whether their involuntary reproduction is possible is not solved by experiments. It remains only to rely on introspection and the stories of other people.

It is impossible not to note the effect of a trace from a strongly experienced emotion that Blonsky singled out: it can subsequently be excited by weaker stimuli of the same kind, that is, it becomes a latent dominant focus for a person, a “sick corn”, by accidentally hitting which one can evoke a new strong emotional reaction.

According to Blonsky, of the three emotions that are well remembered (suffering, fear and surprise), not all are remembered in the same way. It’s better not to talk about remembering surprise as a feeling, he writes: the surprising impression is remembered, and the feeling of surprise is not of such a nature as to be excited with a homogeneous stimulus, since surprise is an emotional reaction precisely to a new one. Pain and suffering are often reproduced in the form of fear, which is not surprising, since there is a genetic link between fear and pain.

The presence of emotional memory has already been questioned by P. V. Simonov (1981). The basis for this was his research on the arbitrary reproduction of various emotions by actors. Here is what Simonov writes about this: “We have had to read about the so-called “emotional memory” more than once. According to these ideas, an emotionally colored event not only leaves an indelible mark on a person’s memory, but, having become a memory, invariably causes a strong emotional reaction every time any association reminds of a previous shock. Trustingly following this axiom, we asked our subjects to recall the events of their lives associated with the strongest emotional experiences. Imagine our amazement when such intentional memories were accompanied only in a very limited percentage of cases by pronounced shifts in skin potentials, heart rate, respiration, frequency-amplitude characteristics of the electroencephalogram. At the same time, memories of faces, meetings, life episodes that were by no means connected in the anamnesis with any out of the ordinary experiences, sometimes caused exceptionally strong and persistent, objectively recorded shifts that could not be extinguished when they were repeated. A more thorough analysis of this second category of cases showed that the emotional coloring of memories does not depend on the strength of the emotions experienced at the moment of the event itself, but on the relevance of these memories for the subject at the moment. How could one not remember Chekhov’s Ionych, who, with an ironic grin, drives past the house of the girl he once loved, past the balcony, where he spent the night in a state of shock and delight. It became clear that the matter was not in “emotional memory” and not in emotions in themselves, but in something else, hiding behind the facade of emotional experiences” (pp. 3-4).

It seems that Simonov’s conclusion is too categorical. Firstly, he himself notes that in a certain number of cases, the vegetative expression of emotions during their recollection was nevertheless noted (this, by the way, was also confirmed in the studies of E. A. Gromova et al., 1980, see Fig. 9.1). Secondly, the fact that the physiological reflection of emotions was observed mainly in cases of recalling significant events does not negate the presence of «emotional memory» soldered to event memory. Failure to reproduce emotional reactions could be associated with different emotionality of the subjects.

It is no coincidence that in a later work (Simonov, 1987) he no longer speaks so categorically about emotional memory. So, he writes: “We, apparently, have the right to speak about emotional memory in a “pure form” only in those special cases when neither the external stimulus that provoked the memory, nor the engram extracted from the memory, are reflected in consciousness and the resulting emotional reaction seems unreasonable to the subject (Kostandov, 1983)” (p. 80).

It is believed that the arbitrary reproduction of emotional experiences is given to a person with difficulty. However, P. P. Blonsky, for example, came to the conclusion that the voluntary reproduction of emotions is almost impossible for many people, but the fact that emotional memory can be reproduced involuntarily cannot be refuted. Probably, it is the involuntary reproduction of emotions that takes place in the cases that W. James speaks of. W. James, on the contrary, noted one characteristic feature of emotional memory: “A person can even become more furious thinking about the insult inflicted on him than directly experiencing it on himself, and after the death of his mother he can have more tenderness for her than during her lifetime. » (1991, p. 273).

Another controversial question: what emotional experiences are better remembered — positive or negative? Among Western psychologists in the first quarter of the 1905th century, the point of view that positive emotions are better retained in memory (Ebbinghaus, 1925; Freud, 3) became widespread. 1933. Freud substantiates this by the exclusion from memory of everything that causes painful sensations. However, the experiments confirming this position were not always perfect and caused criticism by many psychologists. For example, P. Young (Young, XNUMX) criticized studies with the memorization of words of pleasant and unpleasant content, pointing out the mixing of real experience with a «cold cognitive understanding» of pleasant and unpleasant content.

In contrast to the views of Western psychologists, P. P. Blonsky (1935) argued that negative emotions are better remembered, and supported his thesis both with arguments about the biological expediency of this, and with a number of studies. So, he writes that an animal that forgets what causes it suffering is doomed to a quick death. It is difficult to argue with this postulate. But it is difficult to disagree with his opponents, who see in the easier forgetting of an unpleasant effect useful for life — protection from painful experiences.

I believe that this dispute arose from a misunderstanding. The parties to the dispute did not take into account that memorization, which they talk about all the time, citing life examples, was not discussed by them in essence. Both Z. Freud and P. P. Blonsky spoke about remembering pleasant and unpleasant. As for the latter, the real picture is obviously more complicated than Blonsky imagined. So, he himself notes that the closer the events (for example, what happened yesterday), the more often the pleasant is remembered than the unpleasant, and the further (for example, what happened in childhood), the more often the unpleasant is remembered than the pleasant. Pleasant things are more often remembered by those who are dissatisfied with their current position (for example, losers, old people). From here, Freud may also be right with his postulate of «repression» of the negative, that is, the desire to forget it or, in extreme cases, try not to remember it; after all, he dealt with people who were dissatisfied with life.

E. A. Gromova (1980) notes that one of the properties of emotional memory is its gradual evolution over time. Initially, the reproduction of the experienced emotional state is strong and vivid. However, as time goes by, this experience becomes weaker and weaker. An emotionally colored event is easily remembered, but without the experience of emotion, although with some affective imprint: an undifferentiated experience of pleasant or unpleasant. From my point of view, this means that emotion is reduced to the emotional tone of impressions.

At the same time, some generalization of the process is observed. If the initial emotion was caused by some particular stimulus, then over time the memory of it spreads to other similar stimuli. P. P. Blonsky concludes that with such a generalization of emotional experience, there is a decrease in the ability to differentiate the stimuli that give rise to it. For example, if a certain dog scared a child in childhood, then as an adult, a person is afraid of dogs in general.

The memory of the experienced pain is preserved for a very long time (except for labor pains). This fear makes people prefer to remove a tooth than to treat it with a drill, acquaintance with which took place in early childhood (B. M. Fedorov, 1977).

P. P. Blonsky gives examples of the influence of emotional memory on the formation of character. A terrible punishment in childhood can make a person fearful, a constant memory of an experienced misfortune — melancholic, etc.

Interesting data testifying to emotional memory are given by Yu. L. Khanin (1978) on the memorization of sportswomen and athletes of their anxiety before and during competitions. In one case, the gymnasts were asked to assess their condition an hour before the start of the competition and before each of the four apparatuses of the gymnastic all-around. Then, after 18 days, each gymnast, according to her memoirs, retrospectively assessed «how she felt an hour before the start of the competition and before each apparatus.» It turned out that retrospective and real assessments of situational anxiety were quite close to each other. The correlation coefficients were especially high in relation to experiences in front of those implements that the gymnasts were most afraid of.

Based on the results obtained by Khanin, it can be assumed that women have a better emotional memory than men. The following facts lead to this conclusion.

A group of female divers were asked 20 days before important competitions to evaluate retrospectively, based on their past experience, using the situational anxiety scale “their state before important competitions”. Then, immediately before the competition (two hours before the start of the performance), the actual observed level of anxiety was measured using the scale of situational anxiety.

It turned out that there is a close correlation between these two indicators. In men, as a result of the same study, no significant correlation was found.

True, the revealed differences between men and women in remembering their experiences can be explained by worse reflection in men than women and less expressiveness and anxiety in men than women, but all this also needs to be proven.

It should be noted that the term «emotional memory» is not always used adequately. For example, B. B. Kossov (1973) talks about the emotional memory of chess players, but in fact he studied the influence of emotion on memorization (how emotional excitement affects the memorization of positions in a game).

Emotional hearing

This term was introduced by V.P. Morozov (1991) and means the ability to recognize emotions from human speech and singing. That this ability exists may be indicated by the fact that there is no correlation between emotional hearing and speech hearing. Therefore, «emotional deafness» can also occur in people with well-developed speech perception. Emotional hearing is a phylogenetically older ability. In favor of the existence of this ability is also evidenced by the fact that subjects of different ages, genders and professions showed significant differences in the correctness of emotion recognition — from 10 to 95 %. It was found that musicians and vocalists have a more developed emotional ear. In this regard, emotional hearing began to be considered as one of the criteria for artistic talent, which began to be used in the entrance exams to the conservatory. In the context of the issue discussed in this paragraph, it is not important how emotional hearing is suitable for professional selection, but how much it helps to recognize a person’s emotions.

A. Kh. Pashina (1992) showed that the same percentage of recognition of all emotions in two subjects can be with a different number of correctly identified emotions. In this regard, she put forward an idea about the structure of emotional hearing. She found that subjects differently recognize the number of emotions presented: some — all five, others — four, thirds — three, etc. Most of all, musicians recognize emotions, then students of a mathematical school, a smaller number of correct identifications were among students in the graduating class of the orphanage (Fig. 9.2).

These data indicate that emotional hearing depends on the experience people acquire in the process of communication. But, on the other hand, there are individuals who, even without experience, are able to recognize all five emotions, which speaks in favor of the fact that emotional hearing can be innate.

Differences between the samples were also found in the type of emotions that the main part of the subjects of each sample determines with the maximum probability compared to other emotions. Thus, students of the music faculty identified “joy” and “neutral” with greater accuracy. Eighty-five percent of «math» students were better at defining «neutral» and then «joyful.» Orphanage staff were better at identifying “neutral” and “sadness”. The pupils of the orphanage in the first place were «fear» and «neutral». This suggests that what is experienced by the subject himself is better recognized.

Pashina found that those who recognize only one emotion have a low level of empathy and a normal level of anxiety, while those who recognize all five emotions have a fairly high level of empathy and very high situational anxiety. In addition, it matters what the subject’s emotional background is at the moment, that is, what emotion he is experiencing at the moment (Fig. 9.3).

9.2. Information used by a person in recognizing the emotions of others

The discussion of this issue is connected with the so-called «cognitive schemes of emotions», that is, with the establishment of a set of features that can be used to judge the presence of a particular emotion. Comparison of the set of observed features with the scheme allows you to identify emotion. It is assumed that none of the signs is strictly tied to a certain emotion, and its identification is carried out on a probabilistic basis.

Unlike the recognition of one’s own emotion, where the leading feature is the subjective experience of emotion, the recognition of other people’s emotions is carried out mainly by external manifestations of emotions: facial expressions and posture, changes in speech and voice, behavior, vegetative reactions. Also taken into account antecedents, that is, what precedes and causes emotions: the situation in its interaction with the person’s goal (Frijda, 1986). Thus, if the observer imagines the situation in which the person finds himself, his goal at the moment and the external manifestations of the emotion, then he has enough information to recognize the emotion. It should be noted that in the Russian psychological literature this issue was discussed by A. S. Zolotnyakova (1964), who showed that for a five-year-old child, means expressing expression become signal only in the context of actions and situations.

Indicative in this regard is the experiment set by M. Sherman (Scherman, 1927,1928, XNUMX). He filmed the emotions of children a few days old (whose emotional responses are not yet differentiated) in four situations: a fall from a small height, a pin prick, a restriction of head movements, and manifestations of hunger. Then this film was shown to nurses, doctors, students under three different conditions:

1) the film was shown in full, the observers saw both the situation and the answer;

2) only emotional reactions were demonstrated;

3) emotional reactions were demonstrated, preceded by an inadequate situation.

In addition, the observers were shown the children themselves. Stimulation was carried out behind the screen, which was quickly removed.

Under the first condition, when the interpretation of the observed emotion was preceded by knowledge of the situation, almost all observers correctly identified the emotions of newborns. In the second version, as in the last one, when the children themselves were shown, the observers most often spoke of anger. In the third variant, the observers named the emotions that corresponded to the situations shown, and not the expressions of the babies. So, if the child’s reaction to the restriction of head movements (anger) was preceded by a situation of falling, then the observers defined this emotion as fear.

Thus, it is obvious that in the perception of the emotions of others, the conditioned reflex connections formed in ontogenesis between the situation and the accompanying emotion and the effect of causal attribution are of great importance. The so-called «emotional-cognitive» complexes (affective-cognitive structures, according to K. Izard) are formed.

N. D. Bylkina and D. V. Lyusin (2000) note that people give different emotional reactions to the same situations, even if their goals are the same. There are no unambiguous connections between emotion and its external expression. Therefore, to identify the emotions of other people, it is necessary to take into account additional information about some intermediate variables, such as the individual characteristics of a person, the cultural characteristics of the community to which he belongs, the current physical and mental state of the observed person. These intermediate variables are called mediators.

As a result, Bylkina and Lyusin proposed their own cognitive scheme of emotions (Fig. 9.4). Note that the scheme’s name does not match its purpose; in essence, this is not a scheme of emotions, but a scheme identification emotions.

The authors note that they do not consider this scheme as final and most complete. However, it is a convenient model that allows us to trace the development of the organization of knowledge about emotions with age. It should be clarified here that this model only allows us to develop methods for identifying this knowledge on its basis, but does not reveal this knowledge by itself. This is exactly what N. D. Bylkina and D. V. Lyusin did, but the technique developed by them was aimed not so much at revealing knowledge about emotions as at clarifying the role (significance) in identifying an emotion of its cause (antecedent), its external expression and mediators. In other words, the methodology was supposed to show which of these three factors children of different ages take into account when identifying positive and negative emotions.

9.3. Models of characteristics by which emotions of other people are recognized

A very important question is: based on what characteristics of emotions does a person recognize and differentiate them? W. Wundt (1896) argued that the entire system of feelings can be defined as a variety of three dimensions (sensations): pleasure-displeasure, relaxation-tension and calmness-excitation (Fig. 9.5). Thus, he formulated a multidimensional model of emotions, guided by which a person recognizes and distinguishes emotions.

The multidimensional model of emotions considers all emotions in a multidimensional space, limited by the number of variables (coordinates): negativity — positivity, strength — weakness, activity — passivity. An adequate method for a multivariate model is the multivariate scaling method (MMS). The essence of this method is that it makes it possible to find out the minimum allowable number of scales (factors, signs) that a person is guided by when making a judgment about the difference or similarity of emotions, determined by him by facial expression in photographs (the degree of similarity was assessed on a nine-point scale for 13 photos in pairs in all possible combinations). In different studies, the number of selected factor scales is different: in some, as in W. Wundt, there are three, in others — two. Most researchers tend to a two-factor model, the orthogonal axes of which are the sign of emotion and the level of activation. As a result, all emotions, depending on their similarities and differences, are located in a two-dimensional space.

One could agree with this if one of the axes was not so much the sign of emotions as their modality. In addition, taking into account the level of activation (the degree of emotional arousal) leads psychologists to unreasonable, in my opinion, but enshrined in the language, the allocation of qualitatively new emotions, while in fact we should talk about emotions of the same modality, but expressed to varying degrees. . Let me explain what is at stake. In the method of I. Irankova, in connection with the sign, blocks of emotions are distinguished, among which, as different in modality, anxiety, anxiety, fear, timidity, fear, horror, on the one hand, and pleasure, delight, pleasure, bliss, joy, jubilation, on the one hand, are listed. the other side. It seems to me that it would be more logical, using the axis of activation (excitation level), to talk about the shades of the manifestation of emotional response: in one case, about the emotional tone of pleasure, which, when strengthened, is called pleasure, bliss, and then delight, in the other case — about emotions of joy, which, when strongly expressed, are designated as glee, and in the third case — about the emotion of anxiety (anxiety), which, as it intensifies, is designated as fear, fear and, finally, horror; in the fourth case, the increase in discontent gives the following chain of verbal designations of this negative experience: irritation — indignation — anger (indignation) — rage — rage.

With this in mind, the attempt of J. Russell and colleagues to apply the method of multidimensional scaling to subjective assessments of the similarity of emotions given verbally by the subjects is not very logical. They obtained a two-dimensional circular model of emotional experience. In this model, emotions are arranged in a circle in the following sequence: pleasure (0 °), arousal (45 °), activation (90 °), distress (grief-sadness — 135 °), displeasure (180 °), depression (225 °) , drowsiness (270°), relaxation (315°). I see the illogicality of this model in that it more often deals with physiological states of activation than with emotional reactions of different signs and modalities. J. Russell and colleagues applied the MMS to subjective assessments of the similarity of emotions given verbally by the subjects. As a result, a two-dimensional circular model of emotional experience was obtained. In this model, emotions are arranged in a circle in the following sequence: pleasure (0″), arousal (45°), activation (90°), distress (grief-sadness — 135°), displeasure (180°), depression (225°) , drowsiness (270°), relaxation (315°). I see the illogicality of this model in that it more often deals with physiological states of activation than with emotional reactions of different signs and modalities. On fig. 9.6 shows a two-dimensional space of terms that characterize a person experiencing various emotions.

Table 9.1 Reflection of various elements of the expression of another person by adolescents

This model was confirmed by J. Russell and his collaborators during an extensive cross-cultural study of people who use English, Greek, Polish and Estonian. The isomorphism of the perceptual and semantic emotional space testifies to the unity of the principles of encoding information about emotions at the perceptual and semantic levels.

To recognize the emotions of another person, various channels of expression are used: facial expressions, speech, vegetative and motor reactions. In a study by V. N. Kunitsyna (1973), using the verbal portrait method, it was revealed that 14-year-old adolescents use these channels differently (Table 9.1).

The last row in the table indicates that it is easier for a teenager to give a general assessment of a person’s expression in terms of its dynamics in the process of communication than in individual channels of expression. It is difficult to say to what extent the data presented in the table reflect the age characteristics of adolescents, since other age groups were not studied by the author.

9.4. Identification of emotions by facial expressions and pantomime

It has been shown (Toom, 1981) that despite individual differences in the depiction of emotions by different communicators, people recognize joy, surprise, suffering, and anger quite accurately by their facial expressions. Contempt and fear are recognized worse. Contempt is often confused with anger.

Understanding (identification) of the emotions of another was studied by V. A. Barabanshchikov and T. N. Malkova (1988). They identified conditions common to all modalities of emotions for their identification by facial expressions. It is easiest to identify holistic facial expressions, including changes in all areas of the face at the same time. The most difficult to identify mimic manifestations in the forehead-eyebrows (emotions were not recognized in half of the cases). Twice more accurately identify emotions by changes in the eye area and lower face.

At the same time, there are optimal identification zones for different emotions. Thus, the expression of emotions of grief and fear in the eye area is more easily identified than in the lower part of the face; expressive characteristics of anger-calmness are easily detected in the forehead-eyebrow area (although, according to K. Izard, anger is the only emotion whose recognition requires the presence of mimic changes in all areas of the face at the same time); the expression of joy, disgust, doubt is most accurately identified by changes in the lower part of the face (Fig. 9.7).

Speaking about the recognition of emotions by facial expressions, one should listen to the idea expressed by S. L. ueshtein (1999) that “in an isolated facial expression, they look in vain for the disclosure of the essence of emotions; but from what taken in isolation facial expression, without knowing the situation, it is not always possible to determine emotions, it is incorrectly concluded that we recognize emotions not by facial expression, but by the situation that causes it. In fact, one can only conclude from this that for the recognition of emotions (especially complex and subtle ones), facial expression serves not by itself, not in isolation, but in relation to all the specific mutual understandings of a person with others ”(p. 567).

The advantage of women in decoding emotions from facial expressions has been revealed (Galagher and Sheentich, 1981; Jancik, 1981). However, as shown by R. Rosenthal and M. De-Paulo-Bella (Rosental, De-Paulo-Bella, 1979), the advantage of women in recognizing emotions by voice is not revealed.

Emotions are also reflected in a person’s posture (Fig. 9.8), but researchers pay much less attention to this issue.

Cultural characteristics affect both the accuracy of recognizing the modality of emotions and the assessment of the intensity of their manifestation. In a cross-cultural study by Yu. V. Granskaya (1998), it was shown that students from Russia were much more successful than students from other countries in recognizing fear, sadness, surprise, disgust, and less successfully — happiness, anger, joy. The author explains the decrease in sensitivity to a number of emotional states among Russian students by the circumstances of their lives, the great tolerance of Russian people, which leads to a more positive interpretation of the emotion of anger.

It should also be taken into account that the external manifestations of emotions, representing a synthesis of involuntary and arbitrary ways of responding, are more dependent on the cultural characteristics of a given people.

Known, for example, is the tradition of English upbringing not to show outwardly one’s emotions. The same is observed with the Japanese. For example, in the work of P. Ekman (Ekman, 1973) the following fact was revealed. At the time of the demonstration of the «stressful» movie, American and Japanese subjects expressed their feelings differently when watching the movie alone or together with their compatriots. When both the American and the Japanese were alone in the cinema, their facial expressions were identical. When both were together with a partner, the Japanese, compared to the American, masked negative emotions with positive ones much more strongly. In this regard, one cannot fail to recall a documentary shown on television in the early 1990s about the behavior of Japanese passengers of an airliner that had an accident in the air: there was no panic, no tears, no screams among them; everyone sat in their seats with a calm expression on their faces.

Comparing Estonian and Kyrgyz assessments of various facial expressions in the context of “he lost someone dear to him,” it was found that Estonians exaggerated sadness and underestimated fear as compared to Kyrgyz (Niit, 1977).

Different peoples have the same means of expression to denote different emotions. O. Klineber (Klineber, 1938), studying emotional expression in Chinese literature, revealed that the phrase «her eyes widened and opened wide» means not surprise, but anger; and surprise reflects the phrase «she stuck out her tongue.» Clapping hands in the East means annoyance, disappointment, sadness, and not approval or delight, as in the West. The expression «scratched his ears and cheeks» means an expression of pleasure, bliss, happiness.

9.5. Perception of emotional state by speech

An important channel for identifying the emotional state of a person is his speech. However, in the ontogenetic development of a person there is an infantile period, when he still does not speak, but only makes sounds. The question arises: to what extent are parents able to confidently determine their emotional content in the sounds of their children? It has been shown that this possibility is inherent in adults, regardless of whether they have experience of communicating with babies or not (Pavlikova, Novikova, 2000). However, biologically more significant signals are more accurately evaluated. At the same time, some signals were regarded as opposite to the state in which they were registered.

T. V. Korneva and E. F. Bazhin (1977) found that differences in the accuracy of voice recognition of emotions are mainly related to the modality of emotions. The subjects made the least number of errors in this assessment when identifying anger and even mood. The average score of their identification was 99,3 and 97,0, respectively. Other emotions were rated worse. So, the average score for identifying low mood was 75,8; anxiety — 81,4; apathy — 80,7; elevated mood — 79,5.

Curious data were obtained by these authors regarding the accuracy of emotion recognition by people of different professions. Emotions were best recognized by psychiatrists in comparison not only with mathematicians and engineers, but even in comparison with doctors of other specialties (therapists, ophthalmologists, otolaryngologists, etc.). Obviously, this is due to the fact that psychiatrists professionally develop attention to all manifestations of the expression of their patients.

E. F. Bazhin et al. (1976, 1977) found that during verbal recognition of the voices of speakers who were in an elevated mood, in a certain number of cases their erroneous mixing with a normal, even mood is noted, but almost never with anxious, apathetic voices. and depressed patients. The latter are mixed with each other in 30% of recognitions and sometimes, like euphoric voices, they are confused with the norm.

According to S. N. Kolymba (1974), a set of intonational means is sufficient to distinguish between individual groups of emotional states, but without connection with other means (communication situations, facial expressions, gestures) is insufficient to differentiate the shades of these states within each group.

The study by V. Kh. Manerov (1993) of the identification of emotions in speech showed that the main feature used by a person in the auditory perception of emotionally conditioned changes in speech is the degree of speech motor excitation. Determining the type of emotion experienced by the speaker is carried out by the listener (auditor) less successfully than determining the degree of emotional arousal. Basic emotions are most accurately identified, followed by surprise and uncertainty, and worst of all, contempt and disgust. The accuracy of emotion recognition is affected by the speaker’s ability to convey emotional states in speech, as well as the experience of the auditor.

A. A. Borisova (1989) studied the success of identifying the emotional state of a person by the intonation pattern of speech. It turned out that this was a rather difficult task for the listeners, even when the intonations were reinforced by the content of the utterances. The author identified two factors that affect the accuracy of the perception of the emotional state: the individual experience of people in the differentiation of experiences and the sign and modality of the presented emotion. The state of joy was most easily determined, then admiration; worst of all is the state of curiosity. An intermediate position in terms of the accuracy of the definition was occupied by states of indifference, surprise, resentment, melancholy and anxiety. The tendency of better recognition of positive emotional states in comparison with indifferent and negative ones was revealed.

The ability to recognize emotions in speech depends on the characteristics of the individual. T. V. Korneva (1978) and V. Kh. Manerov (1990) found that sensitive, anxious, easily vulnerable, insightful, cautious in contacts with people, subjects better recognize emotions in speech.

9.6. «Verbal Standards» for Perceiving the Expression of Various Emotions

The study of V. A. Labunskaya (1998) is devoted to the study of individual selectivity in the description of signs of expression of emotional states of various modalities, as well as to the identification of types of “verbal standards” of expression.

The results obtained by her indicate that people, when recognizing emotions, are guided by a limited number of expressive units, among which the most frequently used ones stand out. Thus, the length of the vocabulary of expressive units joy consists of 19 judgments, but only a few of them were used by the subjects often — this is a «smile» — 90 % cases, «eyes shine» — 35%, «laughter» -30%, «general animation» — 20%.

The length of the vocabulary of expressive features surprise consists of 11 judgments; of these, the following were most often used: «eyes wide open» — in 70% of cases, «eyebrows raised» — in 57%, «mouth parted» — in 40%, «questioning look» — in 30%.

Dictionary of expressive features contempt includes 11 judgments, among which there are also frequently used ones: “crooked smile” — 41 % cases; «cold look» — 32%, «corners of the mouth are lowered» — 24 %.

In the process of content analysis of expression anger 18 judgments were singled out. Among them, the main signs were those characterizing facial expressions: “eyebrows are parted” — 38 % cases, «eyes shine» — 41%, «nostrils tremble» — 30%, «lips tightly compressed» — 31%, «face is distorted» — 21%.

Expression feature dictionary length suffering consisted of 13 sentences. The most frequently mentioned signs were: «lips down» — 35 %, «sad eyes» — 40%, «crying» — 21 %.

In descriptions Of fear just as in the descriptions of contempt, suffering, anger, signs related to facial expressions prevail. Most often, the following expressive elements were distinguished: «eyes widened» — 62 % cases, «mouth ajar» -30 %, «frozen face» — 32%, «trembling» — 32%.

Table 9.2 Correlation of elements of expressive behavior in descriptions of emotional states (in %)

Thus, the analysis of the content and structure of expression descriptions (“verbal standards”), carried out by Labunskaya, allowed her to draw the following conclusions:

1) the length of the vocabulary of expressive signs of emotional states ranges from 11 to 19 judgments;

2) each individual pays attention to a limited set, fixing signs of expression;

3) most often, the standards include those features that relate to facial expressions;

4) descriptions consist, as a rule, of typical signs, therefore, expression standards are not very variable;

5) the relationship between the elements of expressive behavior recorded in the descriptions depends on the modality of the state (Table 9.2);

6) the selected elements of expressive behavior correspond to the well-known classification: facial expressions, pantomime, gestures, intonation, vegetative changes;

7) the structure of «verbal standards» of expression includes judgments that characterize the communication of a person in certain states — «communicative personality traits». The appearance in the descriptions of signs that characterize the degree of “communicativeness” of a communication partner indicates that for the identification of a state it is important to assess a person’s behavior from the point of view of his attitude towards other people.

The number of signs related to facial expressions, according to Labunskaya, on average corresponds to 50% of the total number of named elements of expressive behavior. In descriptions of the expression of surprise and suffering, they make up the main part -70-77 %. Signs related to pantomime, human gestures, are recorded mainly in descriptions of joy, fear, anger «Communicative personality traits» are more often included in descriptions of contempt and suffering (15-18%). Other elements of expressive behavior are recorded much less frequently.

So, facial expressions perform the main load in the expression of states, which is reflected in the verbal standards of expression. At the same time, the mimic picture of fear is often interpreted as surprise. The facial expressions of these states include homogeneous signs, but motor activity is characteristic of fear, but not of surprise. Therefore, the absence of pantomimic signs makes it difficult to recognize fear. The states of joy and anger are related to sthenic affects, which are characterized by physical activity, which was reflected in the descriptions of the subjects. The facial expression of these states corresponds to the extreme degree of pleasure and displeasure and is not like other forms of expression. Therefore, despite the fact that pantomime is of great importance as an indicator of these states, it is possible to successfully identify them on the basis of facial expressions alone.

Suffering refers to asthenic affects, which are characterized by inhibited motor activity. Facial expressions in this case perform the main load as an indicator of the state. The same ratio between the elements of expressive behavior is characteristic of contempt.

9.7. Types of «verbal standards» for the perception of the expression of the emotional state of another person

V. A. Labunskaya showed that the subject of cognition in the process of interaction with other people forms a system of standards for the perception of expressive behavior that differ in content, structure, level of generalization, and typicality.

The verbal description of expression is a standard that includes only those features that are recognized by the subject, are for him some constants in the recognition of emotions by facial expressions. Since the verbal standard includes only those signs that are recognized by the subject, the very content of the standard, the number of signs included in the standard, indicates the cognitive capabilities of the subject, his ability to consciously isolate the signs of the state expression.

Below are the types of expression standards identified by Labunskaya for each of the six states (Table 9.3). Verbal expression standards are arranged in accordance with the frequency of their actualization by the subjects: the first column shows the standard that is most typical for a given sample of subjects, the second column shows the less typical one, etc. The location of the features in the standard also corresponds to the frequency of their naming (the distribution of the standards is factorial matrix of descriptions).

First, second and fifth standards the expressi joys classified by the author as «mimic», as they mainly consist of expressive units of facial expressions. They differ from each other in specific characteristics of facial expressions and the frequency of their use. Thus, the 1st standard includes features named by the majority of the members of the experimental group, and the 2nd standard consists of features that have a lower frequency of fixation. The first and second «mimic» standards of joy include both generalized characteristics of expression (laughter) and specific signs (smile, narrowed eyes).

The following standards of joy expression (3rd, 4th, 6th) are “pantomimico-somatic” in content and structure. They included various elements of expressive behavior. «Pantomimic-somatic» standards of joy are not typical, since they contain elements that are relatively rare in descriptions. Unlike mimic standards, «pantomimico-somatic» ones mainly include generalizing, integral characteristics of expression.

Table 9.3 Joy expression patterns

Thus, the standards of joy expression are represented by two types: mimic and pantomimico-somatic.

Almost all types of expression templates surprise (Table 9.4) are classified by Labunskaya as «mimic». The exception is the 3rd standard. It presents various elements of expressive behavior (facial expressions, intonations, gestures). This standard of expression of surprise is complex. The first mimic standard consists of specific facial movements. The following standards represent a combination of specific and generalized characteristics of mimic expression.

Expression standards contempt in terms of content and structural characteristics, Labunskaya belong to mimic and complex (Table 9.5). They are basically the same as described above.

First, 4th and 5th expression standards suffering (Table 9.6) are mimic in their characteristics. They include specific changes in the facial expression of suffering. Mimic standards differ from each other in terms of frequency indicators of signs. The second, 3rd, 6th standards are pantomimico-somatic. They consist of various elements of expressive behavior, which are poorly differentiated and belong to integral, generalized indicators.

Mimic standards include signs that are most often recorded by the subjects. The exception is the 6th standard. It includes signs that are characteristic not only for the expression of the state of contempt, but also for the attitude of the person experiencing it to other people. This once again confirms the conclusion that on the basis of expressive behavior, not only the recognition of the state, but also the entire system of relations between partners is carried out. There is an attribution of personality traits to the experiencing person.

Table 9.4 Surprise patterns

Table 9.5 Contempt expression patterns

Table 9.6 Patterns of suffering expression

The sixth standard is atypical and relatively rare, but its appearance indicates another type of selective attitude towards indicators of expressive behavior, namely, the choice of those features that suggest the presence of a partner.

Main type of expression templates Of fear (Table 9.7), in contrast to the standards of surprise, contempt, suffering — this is “pantomimico-somatic”. Along with facial expressions, the standard includes various elements of expressive behavior: pantomime, intonation, extralinguistic characteristics, somato-vegetative reactions. This is clearly seen when considering the 1st and 2nd standards. They include signs that were often recorded by the subjects and refer to various elements of expressive behavior. The fourth standard is mimic. It also includes features that are often named, but such a combination of them is much less common than a combination of elements included in the 1st and 2nd standards.

Table 9.7 Patterns of fear expression

Thus, in contrast to the previous states, for which mimic standards were typical, for fear, the pantomimico-somatic standard is characteristic. What is common between the standards of fear and other states is that generalizing, integral indicators of expressive behavior predominate in pantomimic-somatic standards, and single signs prevail in mimic ones.

typical for expression anger is a pantomimico-somatic standard (Table 9.8). Along with it, Labunskaya also identified mimic standards (2nd, 5th, 6th), which consist of specific changes in the facial expression of anger.

The standards of anger are characterized by emphasized psychomotor skills (a person is described as rushing about, gesticulating, etc.). In terms of content and structure, the standards of anger expression reflect the patterns described on the basis of the analysis of the standards of other states.

As Labunskaya believes, the results obtained indicate that the recognition of facial expressions is carried out on the basis of the complexes-features identified in the drawing. The ability to dismember and present schematically the variations of signs of mimic expressions has a positive effect on the process of its identification. At the same time, the representation of individual features in the standards is not always sufficient for the recognition of an expression, especially if it has a complex structure.

Thus, according to Labunskaya, in communication, those partners who successfully exteriorize the standards in a graphical way will be more successful in recognizing the emotional states of people, and their verbal standards include mainly facial expressions. The relevance of the standard is determined by the complexity of the expression that the subject has to recognize. An analysis of the results obtained in determining the relationships between the above indicators also allowed her to conclude that individuals who have developed graphic expression standards and who can spontaneously exteriorize them within a short period of time will be more successful in communication. This skill is more important than the ability to verbalize signs of expression.

9.8. Non-verbal (figurative) perception of emotions

E. F. Bazhin et al. (1981) note that when recognizing the emotions of another person, verbal reports are most often used. However, there is evidence that a significant part of information processing occurs at the non-verbal, figurative level, which gives reason to use the color test when recognizing emotions.

The authors make the assumption that an emotiogenic stimulus, causing a certain mental reaction, associatively “draws” into its orbit a variety of sensory images, which may be very far in modality from the stimulus that caused them, but similar to it in emotional meaning.

To test this assumption, Bazhin et al. conducted a study using the Luscher color test. The subjects were presented to listen to the voice of speakers in various emotional states. The subjects were asked to rank the colored cards according to the state of the announcer. It turned out that green and purple colors corresponded to a normal, even mood (they were located in the first or second place). Red and yellow colors were associated with the speaker’s elevated mood, while gray, blue and brown were associated with depression, apathy and anxiety.

Table 9.8 Anger expression patterns

The data of Bazhin et al. are confirmed in other works. It is shown that sadness is most consistent with blue, fear with brown. L. Marks (Marks, 1975), E. F. Bazhin and A. M. Etkind (1978) showed that the expressions of positive emotional states correspond to the red-yellow edge of the spectrum. The emotionally neutral state corresponds to the middle — green — part of the spectrum.

Another way of studying the figurative perception of emotions was chosen by E. V. Fetisova (1981). She suggested that the subjects draw on paper fragments of poses corresponding to the states of horror, despair, hidden anger and open aggressiveness shown in the photographs. In 71,5%, the subjects successfully completed the task, that is, they correctly graphically depicted the emotion they perceived in the photograph. The author notes that the identification of emotions in this way was carried out more accurately if the character in the photograph was talking to someone, and not being alone. Unfortunately, the author does not write anything about which emotions were recognized better and which worse.

9.9. The influence of personality traits on understanding the emotions of another person

Understanding the emotions of another person is determined by many factors, in particular, the individual characteristics of both the assessed and the identifying person. So, V. A. Labunskaya revealed that emotions are better recognized by people with a developed non-verbal intelligence, emotionally mobile, more focused on the environment than on themselves. She also found that people who are unsociable, emotionally unstable, with developed imaginative thinking, older people more successfully recognize negative emotional states.

I. A. Pereverzeva (1989) showed that it is more difficult for an observer to recognize emotions in persons with a tendency to negative emotional experiences, since they tend to hide the expression of their emotions. The author comes to the conclusion that the more a person is inclined to control the expression of his emotions, the more difficult it is for another person to recognize them. Since a person who is prone to positive emotional experiences controls his emotions less, they are easier and recognized by the observer.

A. A. Borisova (1982), studying psychological insight, found that “impenetrable” are:

a) “hypo-emotional” people who have low scores on all three main modalities (joy, anger, fear);

b) timid emotions of fear with a high score;

c) subjects with the dominance of emotions of two modalities, one of which is the emotion of fear;

d) «angry», having a high score of emotions of anger.

E. D. Khomskaya and N. Ya. Batova (1998) note that women are significantly more likely than men to see indignation and resentment in photographs, and men see determination (obviously, determination, but both are not emotions). In addition, differences were found, although not significant, in the identification of anxiety, sadness, pleasure (more often identified by women), as well as in pride, grief, indifference and tenderness (more often identified by men). The middle-aged subjects were significantly less likely to see hatred and contempt, and more often, determination, compared to the young and the elderly.