It is easy to submit to someone else’s opinion, to yearn for the past, to be afraid of the authorities, to rely on “maybe” … Sociologists believe that some features of the “Soviet person” even today prevent them from living with dignity. How to get rid of them?
As a result of many years of research, Russian sociologists have found that the features of the “Soviet man” inherited by modern Russians still influence our lives today, predetermining views and actions. We invited sociologist Lev Gudkov, head of the “Soviet Man” project, to the editorial office of Psychologies magazine to sort out the historical “baggage”.
Psychologies: What, in your opinion, is the main thing in the “Soviet man”?
Lev Gudkov: First of all, this is a “new person”, special, who grew up in a closed society. He does not look like people in the past, say, before the revolution, nor like the inhabitants of other countries. Each totalitarian society put forward its own project of the “new man” as the basis of a new society. It was shaped by the state machine of repression, propaganda and mass education.
The main difference between the “new man” in Russia is that he is a conscious person: he accepts any policy of the authorities and demonstrates his readiness to sacrifice himself for the sake of the people, the Motherland, the party only because he does not consider it necessary to go against the current and sees no alternatives to this order in the present and in the future. This is a passive, irresponsible, eternally dissatisfied person, dependent on the state and at the same time inclined to blame the government, officials, bosses, Western countries, visitors … but not himself.
By Soviet people they usually mean the generation of the 1970s, the children of stagnation. What time limits did you explore?
Starting this project, Yuri Levada, who headed the center for 15 years, assumed that the truly Soviet generation were those who were born in the 1920s: they had already been fed by the Soviet regime, and then carried it on their shoulders. And in the late 1980s, at the time of the break of epochs, it was interesting to follow how the values of fellow citizens, their behavior, and collective ideas were changing. Understand how deep the influence of the system is and whether this influence will continue through generational change.
The novelty of the idea was to repeat approximately the same set of questions every five years, starting from 1989.
We naively believed that man is by nature kind and reasonable, and that in changed conditions, freed from oppression, he will be able to manifest this nature of his. That he will not only live differently in the material plane, but also breathe, think, act differently.
Judging by your data, this did not happen. Why?
As a sociologist, I can only state this, but I can hardly fully explain it. At some point, we all found ourselves at a fork in the road.
There was an illusion that a person freed from state violence would become more tolerant, rational, and open. But it turned out the opposite: much more primitive, archaic, pre-Petrine layers and forms of consciousness, collective ideas rose.
We do not tend to value individuality, personal originality, subjectivity
Perhaps because the “Soviet people” are guided by the “usual”, they were brought up on simplified examples. Any uncertainty, ambiguity, complexity causes dissatisfaction and aggression in them – and an open, free society presupposes complexity and diversity. So, instead of becoming more humane and more tolerant, we have become more rigid, intolerant, aggressive.
Why, then, do Russians call themselves “simple”, “hospitable”, “patient”?
“Simple”, “patient” – these are the understandable qualities that are required of citizens in Nabokov’s “Invitation to Execution” (and for the lack of which the protagonist is judged). This, in essence, is “poor quality”: we do not tend to value individuality, personal originality, subjectivity in ourselves, we do not know how to define ourselves through those features that we can be proud of.
Those who were born and raised under Soviet rule are gradually leaving. It turns out that the “Soviet man” as a phenomenon survived the system that gave birth to him?
Perhaps yes. Of course, the system of consumption, mass media, technologies have changed a lot. But, alas, the main institutions that support reproduction have remained practically unchanged: power, law enforcement agencies, courts, mass school. And a young man, entering into life, adapts to these institutions, otherwise he simply will not survive.
“You don’t have to stick your head out”, “everyone does it”, “it’s better to have a bird in your hand”, “the state will take care of me”, “we have our own pride” … Are these our real qualities or is it a cliché?
The “Soviet man,” as Yuri Levada emphasized more than once, is a construct, and not at all an individual real person or group. But the peculiarity of collective representations lies in their coercive force: they force them to comply with, or at least to reckon with them. Therefore, if these features are inherent in 30-40% of the population, then they already have a significant, if not decisive, impact on the development of society. Including blocking changes – we see this in recent years.
What is he, “Soviet man”?
Average: he wants to “be like everyone else”, focuses on patterns, and therefore is suspicious of everything new and unusual. He is incapable of understanding another’s behavior or appreciating his achievement.
“Plain”, that is, limited. He chooses simplified models of relationships, and perceives his primitiveness as a virtue.
adapted to the existing order, with modest requests. This is a passive person who puts up with arbitrariness, pressure, injustice.
Dependent from the state. Relies on him, but does not believe him.
Hierarchical, that is, clearly aware that not only economic and social benefits, but also rights, ethical standards, inner dignity, respect are distributed in accordance with social status.
Slywho considers himself entitled to deceive. His behavior is subordinated to personal material interests, and not to ideas or value ideas.
Unconfident, incapable of adequate self-esteem, lacking self-respect, and at the same time feeling exceptional, involved in something “super-significant”, “supra-individual” – a state, an empire, a people.
Displeased man, disappointed, envious. He feels that he was “not given enough”, his rights were infringed. He is characterized by a variety of complexes, fears, up to xenophobia or confidence in the existence of external and internal enemies, “conspiracies against Russia.”
But why did he turn out that way?
During the XNUMXth century, Russia experienced several waves of violent and very rapid destruction of the structure of society: the First and Second World Wars, terror, emigration, collectivization, mass repressions … The transfer of norms, values and ideas from generation to generation was impossible. In addition, after the revolution, the previously accepted forms of social behavior depreciated, and those who established the new order were much lower in intellectual and cultural level of the former ruling class.
The ideas of the urban lower classes and the rural poor became the norm, which was imposed by the state. With the idea of ”hard rules” followed by the representatives of the “higher” educated, noble, cultured society, both confidence in the absolute value of a person and the concept of honor disappeared. Hence the fatalism, readiness to endure and adapt to an alien external world, and generally passivity in relation to one’s own destiny.
That is, we do not really care about our own future?
Yes, the polls say exactly that. Most Russians do not see the future. 36% do not make plans at all, another 33% limit them to one or two years. This means that we do not have a “long time” consciousness, which allows us to make efforts for professional growth, postpone the fulfillment of desires, and rationally build our own lives.
Where does the feeling of the unreality of the future come from? We do not feel included in what is happening around us, we do not believe that something depends on us, and therefore we do not think about responsibility, ours or those who rule us. Moreover, the public words and actions of leaders have nothing to do with real politics, with management technology. The nature of power seems irrational, power relationships are taboo, impossible to discuss or challenge.
It turns out that the state plays the role of a father: his power is not discussed, he is strict, but he is obliged to ensure our well-being … And his own efforts turn out to be unclaimed?
Yes, in such a situation, neither the state nor the citizens are interested in development. Citizens rely on the government and expect it to take care of them… but at the same time they are sure that the state will deceive, will not give enough, that it is impossible to rely on it. The general desire for stability as the highest good leads to the fact that 56% of Russians prefer to be content with a small but solid income, which gives confidence in the future. And only 21% agree to work hard and get well, even if without any special guarantees for the future.
Paradoxically, 56% of respondents believe that other workers of similar qualifications earn more than they do. Such an envious consciousness, a general feeling of oppression, anger against those who “have settled better” … And from this same feeling of infringement arise xenophobia, nationalism, the belief that we are surrounded by enemies.
But why is resentment, fear, aggression felt in our society all the time, even in economically prosperous times?
The combination of irritation and apathy, aggression and impotence is characteristic of the psychology of prisoners. In our case, this is a feature of closed societies, and it is very difficult to part with such emotions. There is also an unconscious sense of guilt – for the unjust Chechen war, for example, and for the Stalinist terror – and general disbelief in changes for the better.
We may not trust the state, but we do trust those close to us: in all surveys, the main interests, desires and zones of trust are connected with the family. Maybe this is our advantage?
No Unfortunately. The peculiarity of Russia is that our basic trust in the world does not extend beyond the inner circle, which means that in the outside world, on the one hand, we do not trust anyone, and on the other, we consider any deception to be permissible for ourselves.
The family model “strong mother – weak father” is widespread: in Soviet conditions and in the 90s, the father simply could not offer the child a convincing example of well-deserved professional success. Therefore, despite relatively happy and close relationships with parents – especially with mothers – more than a third of the younger generation perceive them as failures.
By recognizing the traits of such a person in ourselves, we will be able to act more freely and consciously.
The main claims to parents: they failed to maintain good (“human”) relations with each other, did not realize themselves in life, did not make a career, worked all their lives, but did not accumulate anything. As a result, more than 40% of young people believe that they will raise their children differently than they raised them. In this one senses, of course, youthful maximalism, but also the preservation of the norms of behavior that have developed in the years of stagnation.
During the years of perestroika, the denial of the experience of elders and an orientation toward what was imposed from the outside transformed into an attitude towards parents as “losers”, “losers” with a “soviet” ideology. So generation gaps persist.
What do you think is next for us?
We don’t know this, of course. But it is possible to find impulses for the development of civil society, for tolerance and diversity. They are concentrated in big cities, in the middle class and in the youth environment. On the other hand, two-thirds of the population live in villages and small towns – and this is a conservative, poor, depressive environment. There, people rely on the state, because there really is nowhere else for them to wait for help.
And yet, 10-15% of Russians share liberal values, achieve a good education, are ready to work intensively and be responsible not only for their “inner circle” … This is also our development potential. I think, by recognizing the traits of the “Soviet person” in ourselves, by seeing how they affect the way we think and live, we will be able to act more freely and consciously, instead of reproducing learned models. This is what gives hope.
Lev Gudkov — sociologist, Doctor of Philosophy, Director , editor-in-chief of the journal Public Opinion Bulletin, author of the book Negative Identity.