Our decision can be predicted seconds before we think we have made it. Are we really deprived of will, if our choice can really be predicted in advance? It is not that simple. After all, true free will is possible with the fulfillment of desires of the second order.
Many philosophers believe that to have free will means to act according to one’s own will: to act as the initiator of one’s decisions and to be able to put those decisions into practice. I would like to cite the data of two experiments that can, if not overturn, then at least shake the idea of our own freedom, which has long been ingrained in our heads.
The first experiment was conceived and set up by the American psychologist Benjamin Libet more than a quarter of a century ago. Volunteers were asked to make a simple movement (say, lift a finger) whenever they felt like it. The processes taking place in their organisms were recorded: muscle movement and, separately, the process preceding it in the motor parts of the brain. In front of the subjects was a dial with an arrow. They had to remember where the arrow was at the moment they made the decision to raise their finger.
First, the activation of the motor parts of the brain occurs, and only after that does a conscious choice appear.
The results of the experiment became a sensation. They undermined our intuitions about how free will works. It seems to us that first we make a conscious decision (for example, to raise a finger), and then it is transmitted to the parts of the brain that are responsible for our motor responses. The latter actuate our muscles: the finger rises.
The data obtained during the Libet experiment indicated that such a scheme does not work. It turns out that the activation of the motor parts of the brain occurs first, and only after that does a conscious choice appear. That is, a person’s actions are not the result of his «free» conscious decisions, but are predetermined by objective neural processes in the brain that occur even before the phase of their awareness.
The phase of awareness is accompanied by the illusion that the initiator of these actions was the subject himself. To use the puppet theater analogy, we are like half-puppets with a reversed mechanism, experiencing the illusion of free will in their actions.
At the beginning of the XNUMXst century, a series of even more curious experiments were carried out in Germany under the leadership of neuroscientists John-Dylan Haynes and Chun Siong Sun. The subjects were asked at any convenient time to press a button on one of the remote controls, which were in their right and left hands. In parallel, letters appeared on the monitor in front of them. The subjects had to remember which letter appeared on the screen at the moment when they decided to press the button.
Neuronal activity of the brain was recorded using a tomograph. Based on the tomography data, scientists created a program that could predict which button a person would choose. This program was able to predict the subjects’ future choices, on average, 6-10 seconds before they made that choice! The data obtained came as a real shock to those scientists and philosophers who lagged behind the thesis that a person has free will.
Free will is somewhat like a dream. When you sleep you don’t always dream
So are we free or not? My position is this: the conclusion that we do not have free will rests not on proof that we do not have it, but on a confusion of the concepts of «free will» and «freedom of action.» My contention is that the experiments conducted by psychologists and neuroscientists are experiments on freedom of action, and not on free will at all.
Free will is always associated with reflection. With what the American philosopher Harry Frankfurt called «second-order desires.» Desires of the first order are our immediate desires that relate to something specific, and desires of the second order are indirect desires, they can be called desires about desires. I’ll explain with an example.
I have been a heavy smoker for 15 years. At this point in my life, I had a first-order desire—the desire to smoke. At the same time, I also experienced second-order desire. Namely: I wished I didn’t want to smoke. So I wanted to quit smoking.
When we realize a desire of the first order, this is a free action. I was free in my action, what should I smoke — cigarettes, cigars or cigarillos. Free will takes place when a desire of the second order is realized. When I quit smoking, that is, when I realized my second-order desire, it was an act of free will.
As a philosopher, I contend that the data of modern neuroscience do not prove that we do not have freedom of action and free will. But this does not mean that free will is given to us automatically. The question of free will is not only a theoretical one. This is a matter of personal choice for each of us.
Free will is somewhat like a dream. When you sleep, you don’t always dream. In the same way, when you are awake, you are not always free-willing. But if you don’t use your free will at all, then you’re kind of asleep.
Do you want to be free? Then use reflection, be guided by second-order desires, analyze your motives, think about the concepts that you use, think clearly, and you will have a better chance of living in a world in which a person has not only freedom of action, but also free will.