Contents
5.1. Reasons for the diversity of emotions
Why do humans and animals need such a variety of emotional reactions? What is the difference between the mechanisms of occurrence of one emotion from another? Why does a given object, a signal, a given situation evoke this particular emotion in us, and not another emotion? Is this the «merit» of the stimulus or the specifics of the work of certain brain structures?
W. James (1991), based on his understanding of the mechanism of the emergence of emotions, saw the reason for the diversity of emotional reactions in the innumerable reflex acts that arise under the influence of external objects and are immediately realized by us. Since there is nothing immutable, absolute in a reflex act, and reflex actions can vary ad infinitum, the mental reflections of these physiological changes, i.e., emotions, also vary ad infinitum.
It should be noted that often the variety of emotions is the result of an incorrect expansion of their list, attribution to emotions of phenomena that have nothing to do with them. For example, in the work of S. O. Berdnikova et al. (2000), emotions include the desire to win recognition and respect, the desire to take revenge, a sense of tension; a feeling of distance that beckons; the desire to communicate, the desire to achieve success in one’s business, the desire to repeatedly acquire something, the desire to do something, to penetrate the essence of phenomena, to overcome disagreements in one’s own thoughts. As follows from this list, the authors expanded the list of emotions at the expense of needs, desires, aspirations, that is, they confused motives with emotions.
5.2. Different approaches to the classification of emotions
The question of the number and types of emotional reactions has been discussed for a long time. Even Aristotle singled out love and hatred, desire and disgust, hope and despair, timidity and courage, joy and sadness, anger. Representatives of the ancient Greek philosophical school of Stoicism argued that emotions, based on two good and two evil, should be divided into four main passions: desire and joy, sadness and fear. They further subdivided them into 32 minor passions. B. Spinoza believed that there are as many types of pleasure, displeasure and desire as there are types of those objects from which we are subjected to affects. R. Descartes recognized six main passions: surprise, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. As you can see, there is no separation of motivational formations (desires) from feelings and emotions in these representations, as well as a separation of feelings and emotions.
Attempts to give universal classifications of emotions were made by many scientists, and each of them put forward his own basis for this. So, T. Brown put a temporal sign as the basis for the classification, dividing emotions into immediate ones, that is, manifested «here and now», retrospective and prospective. Reid. built a classification based on the relationship to the source of the action. He divided all emotions into three groups: 1) which are characterized by a mechanical beginning (instincts, habits); 2) emotions with animal origin (appetite, desire, affectations); 3) emotions with a rational beginning (self-esteem, duty). D. Stewart’s classification differs from the previous one in that the first two Reed groups are combined into one class of instinctive emotions. I. Kant reduced all emotions to two groups, which were based on the cause of emotions: sensual and intellectual emotions. At the same time, he attributed affects and passions to the volitional sphere.
G. Spencer proposed to divide feelings on the basis of their occurrence and reproduction into four classes. To the first he attributed the representative feelings (sensations) arising directly from the action of external stimuli. To the second class — representational-representational, or simple, emotions, such as fear. To the third class, he attributed the representative emotions caused by poetry as an irritant that does not have a specific substantive embodiment. Finally, in the fourth class, Spencer attributed the higher, abstract, emotions that are formed without the help of an external stimulus in an abstract way (for example, a sense of justice).
A. Bain (1902) distinguished 12 classes of emotions.
The founder of scientific psychology, W. Wundt, believed that the number of emotions (more precisely, shades of the emotional tone of sensations) is so large (much more than 50) that the language does not have enough words to designate them.
The opposite position was taken by the American psychologist E. Titchener (Titchener, 1899). He believed that there are only two types of emotional tone of sensations: pleasure and displeasure. In his opinion, Wundt confused two different phenomena: feelings and feeling. Feeling, according to Titchener, is a complex process consisting of a sensation and a feeling of pleasure or displeasure (in the modern sense, an emotional tone). The appearance of the existence of a large number of emotions (feelings), according to Titchener, is created by the fact that an emotional tone can accompany innumerable combinations of sensations, forming a corresponding number of feelings.
Titchener distinguished between emotions, mood and complex feelings (sentimentes), in which states of pleasure and displeasure play an essential role.
The complexity of the classification of emotions lies in the fact that, on the one hand, it is difficult to determine whether the selected emotion is really an independent type or whether it is a designation of the same emotion with different words (synonyms), and on the other hand, whether a new verbal designation emotions are only a reflection of the degree of its severity (for example, anxiety — fear — horror).
W. James drew attention to this, who wrote: “The difficulties that arise in psychology in the analysis of emotions stem, it seems to me, from the fact that they are too accustomed to consider them as absolutely isolated phenomena from each other. As long as we consider each of them as some kind of eternal, inviolable spiritual entity, like the species once considered in biology as immutable entities, until then we can only reverently catalog the various features of emotions, their degrees and the actions caused by them. If, on the other hand, we begin to consider them as products of more general causes (for example, in biology, the difference in species is considered as a product of variability under the influence of environmental conditions and the transmission of acquired changes through heredity), then the establishment of differences and classification will become mere auxiliary means ”(1991, p. 274).
As P. V. Simonov (1970) notes, none of the proposed classifications has received wide recognition and has not become an effective tool for further searches and clarifications. According to Simonov, this is due to the fact that all these classifications were built on the wrong theoretical basis, namely, on the understanding of emotions as a force that directly guides behavior. As a result, emotions appeared that prompt one to strive for an object or avoid it, sthenic and asthenic emotions, etc.
The division of emotions according to the type of contact of living beings. P. V. Simonov (1966), based on the nature of the interaction of living beings with objects that can satisfy the existing need (contact or remote), proposed a classification of emotions, presented in Table. 5.1.
Table 5.1 Classification of human emotions depending on the nature of the action
The author of this classification believes that it is also valid for those human emotions that are caused by the needs of a higher social order, therefore, he does not agree with S. X. Rappoport (1968), who assessed it as a reflection of the biological theory of motivation.
In my opinion, the advantage of this classification is an attempt to find a criterion by which one can differentiate the emotional tone of sensations from emotions proper (contact forms of interaction for the former and distant forms for the latter). But in general, this classification does little to clarify the truth, since for some reason it contains not only emotions, but also volitional qualities (courage, fearlessness) or emotional and personal characteristics (equanimity, optimism).
Later, Simonov (1983), despite the statement about the hopelessness of constructing a complete classification of emotions, again reproduces his classification, though in a shortened form. He bases it on a system of axes of two coordinates: attitude to one’s state and the nature of interaction with objects that can satisfy an existing need. As a result, he received four pairs of «basic» emotions: pleasure-disgust, joy-grief, confidence-fear, triumph-rage. Each of these emotions has qualitative differences in experiences (shades), which are entirely determined by the need, in connection with the satisfaction of which this emotional state arises. The author believes that this classification follows immutably from the «theory of emotions» developed by him. It’s hard to judge whether it’s true or not, but the question arises: why is confidence an emotion, and even a basic one, why can’t I experience pleasure with joy, and disgust with rage? And if I can, then which emotion will be basic, and which will not?
Perhaps the answer to the last question may be that in addition to the basic positive and negative emotions that manifest themselves in their pure form, Simonov also identifies complex mixed emotions, arising from the simultaneous actualization of two or more needs. In this case, as Simonov (1981) writes, the most complex emotional chords can arise (Table 5.2).
In this table, as its author emphasizes, the given emotional states are only rather approximate and conditional examples, therefore it should not be considered as a detailed classification of mixed emotions.
Classification of emotions in connection with needs. Some psychologists, when classifying emotions, proceed from the needs that provoke the appearance of these emotions. This position is taken by P. V. Simonov, who believes that the pleasure of eating barbecue is not the same as the pleasure of contemplating a beautiful picture, and B. I. Dodonov, who agrees with Simonov’s opinion.
Based on the allocation of basic and secondary needs, emotions are divided into primary (basic) — joy, fear and secondary (intellectual) — interest, excitement (Vladislavlev, 1881; Kondash, 1981; Olshannikova, 1983). In this division, it is incomprehensible to attribute excitement to intellectual emotions (if it is appropriate to talk about such emotions at all), and to classify interest as emotions, from my point of view, motivational, and not emotional education. If you follow this principle, then all motivational formations (inclinations, desires, personality orientation, etc.) should be attributed to emotions (which, unfortunately, is observed by some authors).
Table 5.2. Examples of situations and mixed emotional states arising from two coexisting needs‘
K. I. Dodonov (1978) notes that it is generally impossible to create a universal classification of emotions, therefore a classification suitable for solving one range of problems turns out to be ineffective when solving another range of problems.
He proposed his own classification of emotions, and not for all of them, but only for those that a person most often needs and that give direct value to the very process of his activity, which, thanks to this, acquires the quality of interesting work or study, «sweet» dreams, gratifying memories, etc. For this reason, sadness was included in his classification (since there are people who love to be a little sad) and envy did not enter (since even envious people cannot be said that they like to envy). Thus, the classification proposed by Dodonov concerns only “valuable”, in his terminology, emotions. In essence, the basis of this classification is needs and goals, that is, the motives that certain emotions serve. It should be noted that the author often includes desires and aspirations in the category of “emotional tools”, i.e. signs of highlighting this group of emotions, which creates confusion.
1. Altruistic emotions. These experiences arise on the basis of the need for assistance, help, patronage of other people, in the desire to bring joy and happiness to people. Altruistic emotions are manifested in the experience of a feeling of concern for the fate of someone and in caring, empathizing with the joy and good fortune of another, in feelings of tenderness, tenderness, devotion, participation, pity.
2. Communicative emotions. Arise on the basis of the need for communication. According to Dodonov, not every emotion that arises during communication is communicative. When communicating, different emotions arise, but only those that arise as a reaction to the satisfaction or dissatisfaction of the desire for emotional closeness (to have a friend, a sympathetic interlocutor, etc.), the desire to communicate, share thoughts and experiences, find a response to them are communicative. . The author refers to the emotions manifested in this case a feeling of sympathy, disposition, a feeling of respect for someone, a feeling of gratitude, gratitude, a feeling of adoration for someone, a desire to earn approval from close and respected people.
3. Gloric emotions (From Lat. glory — glory). These emotions are associated with the need for self-affirmation, fame, in an effort to win recognition and honor. They arise during real or imaginary «reaping of laurels», when a person becomes the subject of general attention and admiration. Otherwise, he has negative emotions. These emotions manifest themselves in a feeling of wounded pride and a desire to take revenge, in a pleasant tickling of pride, in a sense of pride, superiority, in the satisfaction that a person, as it were, has grown in his own eyes.
4. Praxic emotions (or praxic feelings, according to P. M. Jacobson). These are emotions that arise in connection with the activity, its success or failure, the desire to succeed in work, the presence of difficulties. Dodonov connects their appearance with the “goal reflex”, according to I.P. Pavlov. These emotions are expressed in a sense of tension, enthusiasm for work, in admiring the results of one’s work, in pleasant fatigue, in satisfaction that the day was not in vain.
5. Punic emotions (From Lat. conflict — fight). They are associated with the need to overcome the danger, on the basis of which there is an interest in the struggle. This is a thirst for thrills, intoxication with danger, risk, a sense of sports passion, «sports anger», the ultimate mobilization of one’s capabilities.
6. Romantic emotions. These are emotions associated with the desire for everything unusual, mysterious, unknown. They manifest themselves in anticipation of a “bright miracle”, in an alluring sense of distance, in a sense of the special significance of what is happening, or in an ominously mysterious feeling.
7. Gnostic emotions (From the Greek. gnosis — knowledge). This is what is usually called intellectual feelings. They are connected not just with the need to receive any new information, but with the need for «cognitive harmony», as Dodonov writes. The essence of this harmony is to find the familiar, familiar, understandable in the new, unknown, to penetrate into the essence of the phenomenon, thus bringing all available information to a “common denominator”. A typical situation that arouses these emotions is a problem situation. These emotions manifest themselves in a feeling of surprise or bewilderment, a feeling of clarity or vagueness, in an effort to overcome the contradiction in one’s own reasoning, to bring everything into a system, in a sense of conjecture, the proximity of a solution, in the joy of discovering the truth.
8. aesthetic emotions. In relation to these emotions, there are two main points of view. First: aesthetic emotions in their pure form do not exist. These are experiences in which various emotions are intertwined (Kublanov, 1966; Shingarov, 1971; Yuldashev, 1969). Second: aesthetic emotion is nothing but the feeling of beauty (Molchanova, 1966). According to Dodonov, not every perception of a work of art evokes aesthetic emotions. Aesthetic emotions are manifested in the enjoyment of beauty, in the feeling of graceful, sublime or majestic, exciting drama (“sweet pain”). A variety of aesthetic feelings are lyrical feelings of light sadness and thoughtfulness, touching, a bitterly pleasant feeling of loneliness, the sweetness of memories of the past.
9. hedonistic emotions. These are emotions associated with satisfaction of the need for bodily and spiritual comfort. These emotions are expressed in the enjoyment of pleasant physical sensations from delicious food, warmth, sun, etc., in a feeling of carelessness and serenity, in bliss (“sweet laziness”), in mild euphoria, in voluptuousness.
10. Akisitive emotions (from the French acquisition — acquisition). These emotions arise in connection with the interest in accumulation, collecting, acquiring things. They manifest themselves in joy on the occasion of acquiring a new thing, increasing their collection, in a pleasant feeling when reviewing their accumulations, etc. This classification seems to me somewhat far-fetched. The meaning of the classification of emotions should not be to correlate them with specific types of needs (for this, you still need to have a reasonable and consistent classification of the needs themselves, which is still not there), but to identify groups of emotions that differ in the quality of experiences and their role for humans and animals. It is difficult to agree that the pleasure derived from doing what you love, listening to music or eating food will be qualitatively different. like attitude to what is perceived and felt. Another thing is that various specific sensations are mixed with this attitude, which can create the illusion of various emotions experienced by a person.
A more adequate understanding of the classification carried out by B. I. Dodonov, from my point of view, is available from E. I. Semenenko (1986). The author considers the emotions identified by Dodonov as types of emotional orientation. For students of the Pedagogical Institute, these types according to the brightness of manifestation are arranged as follows:
— when evaluating oneself: praxic, communicative, altruistic, aesthetic, gnostic, gloric, hedonistic, romantic, pugnic, akizitivny;
— when assessed by comrades: praxic, akisitive, communicative, hedonistic, romantic, gloric, aesthetic, gnostic, altruistic, pugnic.
As can be seen from this list, a coincidence was observed in relation to only the praxic and pugnic types of emotional orientation.
The emotional orientation of the personality of athletes in accordance with the classification of B. I. Dodonov was studied by S. O. Berdnikova, Ya. Yu. Kopeyka and V. I. Lysy (2000).
The division of emotions into primary (basic) and secondary. This approach is typical for supporters of the discrete model of the human emotional sphere. However, different authors name a different number of basic emotions — from two to ten. P. Ekman et al., based on the study of facial expression, distinguish six such emotions: anger, fear, disgust, surprise, sadness and joy. R. Plutchik (Plutchik, 1966) identifies eight basic emotions, dividing them into four pairs, each of which is associated with a specific action:
1) destruction (anger) — protection (fear);
2) acceptance (approval) — rejection (disgust);
3) reproduction (joy) — deprivation (despondency);
4) research (expectation) — orientation (surprise).
K. Izard names 10 basic emotions: anger, contempt, disgust, distress (grief-suffering), fear, guilt, interest, joy, shame, surprise.
From his point of view, basic emotions should have the following mandatory characteristics:
1) have distinct and specific neural substrates;
2) are manifested with the help of an expressive and specific configuration of facial muscle movements (facial expressions);
3) entail a distinct and specific experience that is recognized by a person;
4) arose as a result of evolutionary biological processes;
5) have an organizing and motivating influence on a person, serve his adaptation.
However, Izard himself admits that some emotions, classified as basic, do not have all these features. Thus, the emotion of guilt does not have a distinct mimic and pantomimic expression. On the other hand, some researchers attribute other characteristics to basic emotions.
Obviously, those emotions that have deep phylogenetic roots, i.e., are present not only in humans, but also in animals, can be called basic. Other emotions inherent only to a person (shame, guilt) do not apply to them. Interest and shyness can hardly be called emotions either.
Close to this is the division of emotions by R. Plutchik into primary and secondary (the latter means combinations of two or more primary emotions). So, he refers pride (anger + joy), love (joy + acceptance), curiosity (surprise + acceptance), modesty (fear + acceptance), etc. to secondary emotions. feelings, and moral qualities (modesty) and a very strange emotion — acceptance.
The division of emotions into leading and situational. VK Vilyunas (1986) divides emotions into two fundamental groups: leading and situational (derived from the former).
The first group consists of experiences generated by specific mechanisms of needs and coloring directly items related to them. These experiences usually arise when some need is exacerbated and the object that responds to it is reflected. They precede the corresponding activity, encourage it and are responsible for its general direction. They largely determine the direction of other emotions, which is why they are called the leading ones by the author.
The second group includes situational emotional phenomena generated by universal mechanisms of motivation and aimed at circumstances mediating satisfaction of needs. They arise already in the presence of a leading emotion, i.e., in the process of activity (internal or external), and express the motivational significance of the conditions conducive to its implementation or hindering it (fear, anger), specific achievements in it (joy, chagrin), existing or possible situations, etc. Derivative emotions are united by their conditionality by the situation and the activity of the subject, dependence on the leading emotional phenomena.
If leading experiences reveal to the subject the significance of the very object of need, then derivative emotions perform the same function in relation to the situation, the conditions for satisfying the need. In derivative emotions, the need is, as it were, objectified a second time and already more widely — in relation to the conditions surrounding its object.
Analyzing situational emotions in a person, Vilyunas identifies a class of emotions of success-failure with three subgroups:
1) ascertainable success-failure;
2) anticipating success-failure;
3) generalized success-failure.
Emotions stating success-failure respond for changing behavioral strategies; the generalized emotion of success-failure arises as a result of the evaluation of the activity as a whole; anticipatory emotions of success-failure are formed on the basis of ascertaining as a result of their association with the details of the situation. When a situation occurs again, these emotions allow you to anticipate events and encourage a person to act in a certain direction.
L. V. Kulikov (1997) divides emotions (“feelings”) into activation, which include cheerfulness, joy, excitement, tension (emotions of tension) — anger, fear, anxiety, and self-appraisal — sadness, guilt, shame, confusion.
It is obvious that we are not talking about some comprehensive unified classification emotional phenomena, but about their classifications each of which emphasizes some sign by which these phenomena are combined into groups and at the same time separated from other groups. Such signs can be the mechanisms of appearance, the causes that cause emotional reactions, the sign of experiences, their intensity and stability, the influence of emotions on human behavior and activity.