The mind of a commander (B.M. Teplov)

Book: Teplov B.M. Mind of a commander (experience of psychological study of the commander’s thinking based on military historical materials — In the book: Teplov B.M. Selected works. In 2 vols. — T.1. — M., 1985. — P. 223 — 305 .)

​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​ energy, perseverance, etc.). This idea is completely undeniable. Napoleon introduced a new important shade into it: the point is not only that the commander must have both mind and will, but also that there must be a balance between them, that they must be equal: “A military man must have the same character how much mind ”(Napoleon. Selected works. T.1. — M., 1941. — P. 320.). He compared the talents of a real commander with a square in which the base is the will, the height is the mind. A square will only be a square if the base is equal to the height; only the person whose will and mind are equal can be a great commander. If the will greatly exceeds the mind, the commander will act decisively and courageously, but little wisely; otherwise, he will have good ideas and plans, but will not have the courage and determination to carry them out.

Napoleon’s «square formula» was a great success: it is constantly quoted. At the same time, they often go further and raise such a question. Since “balance in nature is rare” (Dragomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 — 1905: Collection of original and translated articles. In 2 vols. T.2. — SP b., 1909. — P. 394 .), then in most cases one will have to put up with the fact that the talent of the commander will turn out to be not a square, but a rectangle, one will have to put up with the fact that the balance, which is an ideal, will be violated. What should be recognized as more desirable: an imbalance in the direction of the will or in the direction of the mind? Which is better: a commander with a predominance of will or a predominance of the mind?

I have not come across cases in the literature when this question would be decided in favor of the mind. Usually the question itself is posed in order to expand the doctrine of the primacy of will in the activities of the commander. Extremely typical in this regard is the point of view of M.I. Dragomirova. In his opinion, «of all the deeds of human war is a matter largely more strong-willed than the mind.» “No matter how brilliant a plan may be, it can be completely spoiled by execution, and execution lies in the realm of the will, if not exclusively, then incomparably more than in the realm of the mind. The most incredible feats were accomplished by almost one will: an example is Suvorov’s crossing of the Alps in 1799. (Ibid. — S.170 — 171.).

Without yet giving a general assessment of this point of view, I will point out in passing that there is one very common misconception here. The function of the mind is the inventing of plans, the function of the will is the execution of them. This is not true. On the one hand, the execution of a plan requires the mind no less than the will, and on the other hand, in the activity of a commander, the planning of a plan is usually inseparable from its execution. This is one of the most important features of the intellectual work of the commander.

practical mind

​ Asking the question of what is the engine of volitional action, Aristotle comes to the conclusion that neither striving in itself can be such («after all, those who control themselves, although they may have a desire and desire for something, but perform actions not under the influence of striving, but follow the dictates of reason”), nor the mind itself (“for the theoretical mind does not think anything related to action, and does not say what should be avoided and what should be pursued”). The true engine of volitional action is «mind and striving», or «reasonable striving». “The mind does not set in motion without striving”, but “both abilities — the mind and striving — determine the movement” (Aristotle. On the Soul. — M., 1937. — P. 9 — 10.). It is this unity of mind and striving that Aristotle calls will, on the one hand, and practical mind, on the other.

The mind of the general is one of the concrete forms of the practical mind in the Aristotelian sense of the term; it cannot be understood as some pure intellect; it is the unity of intellectual and volitional moments.

When they say that a military leader has an outstanding mind, but lacks such strong-willed qualities as decisiveness or moral courage, this means that his mind is not the one that a commander needs. The true mind of a commander cannot be in a person who is weak-willed, timid and weak-willed.

Rare greatness of spirit

“The element in which military activity takes place is danger” (Clausewitz K. On War. — vol. 1. — M., 1941. — P. 40.). “Combat gives rise to the element of danger, in which all types of military activity reside and move like fish in water, like birds in the air” (Ibid. — P. 108.). In the «element of danger» the mind of the commander works, and psychological analysis cannot ignore this circumstance.

It is customary to think that in a state of serious danger, where there is a reason for the emergence of fear, the quality and productivity of mental work decreases. The same Clausewitz wrote: “It is characteristic of human nature that an immediate feeling of great danger for oneself and for others is an obstacle to pure reason” (Ibid. — P. 454). But Clausewitz understood the nature of war well enough not to know that this kind of mental decline in a dangerous situation is not at all inevitable. He knew that for any good warrior, and even more so for any great commander, the situation is just the opposite: the danger not only does not reduce, but, on the contrary, sharpens the work of the mind. “Danger and responsibility do not increase the freedom and activity of the spirit in a normal person, but, on the contrary, have a depressing effect on him, and therefore if these experiences inspire and sharpen the ability of judgment, then, undoubtedly, we are dealing with a rare greatness of the spirit” (Ibid. — v. 2. — M., 1941. — P. 305.).

What Clausewitz is undeniably right about is that such behavior is evidence of the greatness of the spirit. Without such greatness of spirit, there can be no great commander. Clausewitz is also right when he directly connects that “state” which is “called military talent” with the ability to maintain correct judgment in the most dangerous and difficult circumstances. Without such ability, no military talent is unthinkable.

An increase in all mental powers and an intensification of mental activity in an atmosphere of danger is a feature that distinguishes all good generals…

In order to resolve in the shortest possible time those exceptionally complex tasks that confront the military leader at the decisive moments of the operation, it is not enough to preserve the normal powers of the mind. That “inspiration and sharpening of the ability of judgment” is necessary, which Clausewitz was amazed at as a manifestation of “rare greatness of the spirit” (Ibid. — P. 305.).

“Admiration is worthy of getting to the point …”

In science, sometimes a solution that is wrong as a whole, but provides a deep, original and correct coverage of individual aspects of the issue, can sometimes be of high value. It cannot be so in the work of the practical mind. There is no reason to call the commander’s activity of genius, which is wrong in general, i.e. in their end results. The decisions of the general leading the army to defeat will be a bad decision, even if it contains deep, original and correct ideas and combinations. The question always confronts the military leader as a whole, and the point is not only in individual, even if wonderful, ideas, but in the possibility of embracing the whole issue and finding solutions that are the best in all respects.

Clausewitz touched on one of the most important features of the commander’s mind when he wrote that in war «the influence of genius is not so much in the newly found design of the action, which immediately catches the eye, but in the happy outcome of the whole enterprise. Admiration is worthy of getting to the point of silently made assumptions and silent harmony in the whole course of the case, which is found only in the final common success ”(Ibid. — vol. 1. — M., 1941. — P. 159.).

The genius of the whole and the genius of the details

… In military affairs, concreteness of thinking is a necessary condition for success. Genuine military genius is always both the genius of the whole and the genius of details.

One of the distinguishing abilities of Peter the Great was, according to M.M. Bogoslovsky, the ability “with increased attention to one main thing … to remember with great accuracy and take care of various little things” (Bogoslovsky M.M. Peter the Great: Materials for a biography. — M., 1941. — P. 324.).

The frantic and passionate Suvorov knew how to take care of the most prosaic «little things» with no less care and painstaking. The proof of this is his numerous orders, orders not only bearing his signature, but also composed and written by him. Here is an excerpt from one of his orders of 1793, the very syllable of which betrays its great author: “The treasure of observing health in natural rules: 1) drink, kvass; double dishes for him, so that there is no young and sour. If water, then healthy and somewhat seasoned; 2) food; tinned boilers; healthy supplies, baked bread; the food is overcooked, not overcooked, not settled, not warmed up, hot, and for those who have not ripened for porridge, it is deprived of it … this time the air! (Marchenko A.M. Suvorov in his manuscripts. — SP b., 1900. — P.38.).

Turning complex into simple…

At the heart of the solution of any task facing the commander is an analysis of the situation. Until the situation is clarified, it is impossible to speak of either foresight or planning. Information about the situation is the data on the basis of which any strategic, operational or tactical task must be solved.

But is it possible to point to another branch of human activity where the data from which the planning and decision-making mind proceeds would be as complex, diverse and difficult to see as data on the situation in a war?

Information about the enemy, obtained from the most diverse sources and concerning the most diverse aspects of the state of his army, his actions and intentions, the most diverse data on his forces, data on the terrain, in relation to which sometimes one little-noticeable detail can be decisive — in all this and There are many other things that the analyzing mind of a general must sort out before making a decision.

Thus, the first feature of the intellectual work of the commander is the colossal complexity of the material to be analyzed.

His second, no less characteristic feature is the simplicity, clarity, definiteness of the products of this work, i.e. those plans, combinations, decisions to which the commander comes. The simpler and more definite the plan of an operation or battle, the better it is, other things being equal. Clausewitz expressed and proved this idea more than once: “Simplicity of ideas … is the root of good warfare” (Clausewitz K On War. — vol. 2. — M., 1941. — P. 295.).

The largest commanders possessed this quality to the greatest extent. In the characteristics of Suvorov’s art of generalship, this side is always noted as one of the most important: “The simplicity of Suvorov’s ideas was wonderful, and the simplicity of execution corresponded to it” (Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov, in 3 vols. Vol. 1. — SP b ., 1884. — P. 530.).

So, for the intellectual work of the commander, the extreme complexity of the source material and the great simplicity and clarity of the final result are typical. In the beginning — the analysis of complex material, in the end — a synthesis that gives simple and definite provisions. The transformation of complex into simple — this brief formula can be used to designate one of the most important aspects in the work of the commander’s mind.

The ability to find and isolate the essential and the constant systematization of material are the most important conditions that ensure either the unity of analysis and synthesis, or the balance between these aspects of mental activity, which distinguish the work of the mind of a good commander.

Ability to decide

Without risk and daring, the activity of a commander is impossible. This brings us to one of the most important qualities of the commander’s mind, for which very different expressions are used: the ability to take risks, the courage of thought, the courage of the mind … finally, determination …

Clausewitz understood the psychological nature of decisiveness in the following way. Decisiveness, on the one hand, is «the ability … to eliminate the pangs of doubt and the danger of hesitation.» It can take place only when it is necessary to act in the absence of sufficient data: «In those cases where a person has sufficient data … there is no reason to talk about decisiveness, because decisiveness implies doubts, which are not here.» On the other hand, decisive in the sense that is meant, «cannot be people with a limited mind.» Such people can act in difficult situations without hesitation, but not because they are able to overcome doubts, but because they have no doubts and do not arise, since they cannot assess the degree of reliability and completeness of the data available. Such people cannot be said to act decisively; it can be said of them that they act thoughtlessly. A necessary condition for decisiveness is a great mind (insight) and courage. But decisiveness cannot be reduced to them. There are people who have a very penetrating mind and unconditional courage, but their “courage and insight stand apart, without stretching out their hands to each other and therefore do not produce the third property — determination” (Clausewitz On War. — vol. 1. — M., 1941 . — P.67 — 68.).

The courage that underlies decisiveness is different from the courage to face personal danger.

… Suvorov was firmly convinced that the courage of reason that is required from a military leader is a much rarer quality and a much more difficult task than simple personal courage.

… An example is Kutuzov’s leaving Moscow without a fight, contrary to the opinion of the vast majority of Russian military leaders, contrary to the demands of the tsar and all the ruling spheres of St. Petersburg, moreover, contrary to the voice of the majority of the army and people.

Of course, Tolstoy is right when he writes: «… He was horrified at the thought of the order that he had to give.» He understood that he was “in the position of a plague-stricken person, in which Barclay was before Tsarev-Zaimishch” (Tarle E.V. Napoleon’s invasion of Russia. 1812. — M., 1938. — P. 144.) His authority in the army is not could not temporarily stagger after leaving Moscow. “After leaving Moscow,” writes one of the eyewitnesses, “the most illustrious prince ordered to turn his droshky towards the city and, leaning his head on his hand … looked … at the capital and at the troops passing by him with downcast eyes; for the first time, seeing him, they did not shout cheers ”(Ibid. — P. 147.). The immortal greatness of Kutuzov lies in the fact that he was not afraid of the terrible gravity of the responsibility he assumed and did what, in conscience, he considered the only right thing.

Cautious courage

… There is such a mindset that combines the greatest caution and critical thinking with its utmost courage. This is the ability to take great risks, which, according to Dragomirov, is the result of “great understanding” (Dragomirov M.I. Fourteen years. 1881 — 1894: Collection of original and translated articles. — SP b., 1895. — P. 316) . Great commanders can only be those in whom these opposite properties — caution and courage of thought, create a new quality, which would most naturally be called a strange-sounding expression: cautious courage. It is impossible to understand the matter in such a way that here we are talking about some kind of golden mean, about some quality, an average between courage and caution.

It would be wrong to think that in great generals courage is, as it were, moderated, weakened, restrained by caution. On the contrary: caution, high criticality of thought make it possible to take such a bold decision, which is unthinkable outside of this.

An example of Suvorov, who considered it possible to attack even five times larger forces, but «with reason, art and under the answer» (Geisman P.A. The fall of Poland and Suvorov. — In the book: Suvorov in the reports of the professors of the Academy of the General Staff. — St. Petersburg ., 1900. — P. 109.), who with a swift offensive defeated the Turkish army near Rymnik, which was four times larger than the Russian-Austrian forces, and did this as a result of a deeply thought-out calculation (“if the Turks are not yet advancing, then they are not completed the concentration of forces”), who made an assault on Ishmael, insane in courage, but preceded him with a unique preparation in terms of thoroughness and caution (the construction of a copy of the Ishmael rampart and systematic exercises on it, reproducing all phases of the upcoming assault, developing a detailed disposition, etc. ).

Maximum initiative and the ability to subjugate the will of the enemy to your will …

Undoubtedly, the first thing that is required of a military leader is maximum initiative and the ability to bend the will of the enemy to his will. But the whole difficulty of the task lies precisely in the fact that the straightforward implementation of plans, «not taking into account the intentions and desires of the enemy», is only a very gu.e.y and imperfect way of «imposing one’s will.» Such a mode of action, on the surface, may seem impressive, it may have a short-term effect when confronted with an opponent weak-willed and incapable of resistance, but in a serious struggle it cannot lead to long-term success.

Great masters of military affairs acted differently. Their first task was to penetrate into the intention and plans of the enemy: firmly adhere to the principle of «disobedience to the will of the enemy», but precisely for this, begin by subordinating your mind to information about the enemy, and only then draw up your creative and most initiative plan and, when drawing up Subdue his opponent’s will to yours. And the most difficult thing is that this whole cycle is constantly repeated with every new change in the situation, with every new information about the actions and intentions of the enemy.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the ability to penetrate into the plans of the enemy, to guess his intentions, has always been regarded as one of the most valuable qualities of a commander. “As they say, Themistocles once remarked that he considers the highest virtue of a commander to be the ability to understand and predict the plans of the enemy” (Plutarch. Selected Biographies. — M. — L., 1941. — P. 65.).

THEMISTOCLES (c. 525 — c. 460 BC), Athenian commander, leader of a democratic group, during the Greco-Persian wars from 493/492. archon and strategist (repeatedly). He played a decisive role in organizing the all-Greek resistance forces. He achieved the transformation of Athens into a sea power and the creation of the Delian Union. (Note auto-stat.)

“Nothing makes a commander greater,” writes N. Machiavelli, “like penetration into the plans of the enemy.” “The main property that distinguishes a talented commander is the ease of unraveling the character of his opponent” [M. Dragorirov (Dragomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 — 1905: Collection of original and translated articles. In 2 volumes — v.2. — SP b., 1909. — P. 534.)].

MACHIAVELLI (Machiavelli) (Machiavelli) Niccolò (1469-1527), Italian political thinker, historian, author of The Emperor, 1513, ed. 1532, etc. (Approx. ed.-stat.)

A beautiful expression of the «principle of disobedience to the will of the enemy!» But after all, in order to follow this advice, it is necessary, first of all, to know what the enemy wants, what he really wants, and not what he should, according to our assumptions, want.

Suvorov, who sent the following message to the Turks before the assault on Ishmael: “I arrived here with an army. Twenty-four hours to think — will; my first shot is already bondage; storm — death. What I announce to you for consideration ”(Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. — SP b., 1900. — P. 237.), Suvorov, who began the order for the battle of Trebbia with the words: “Take the enemy army in full” (Ibid. . — P. 580.), the same Suvorov showed such a great interest in the enemy that «sometimes he knew the enemy’s position better than the enemy himself» (Ibid. — P. 752.), preferring always to fight with a smart enemy — a feature impossible the commander gu.e.go and an elementary active type …

Characteristic for him are the words spoken at Novi: “Moro understands me, the old man, and I am glad that I am dealing with a smart military leader” — Osipov K.N. Suvorov. — M., 1958. — S.296.

Interaction resists any planning?

Drawing up plans for the war as a whole, individual operations, each upcoming battle is the most important component in the work of generals and their headquarters. But military planning is a special kind of planning. Here the exceptional difficulties with which the intellectual work of a military leader is connected come out with extreme brightness.

“The interaction that takes place (in war) by its very nature opposes any planning,” wrote Clausewitz (K. Clausewitz On War. — vol. 1. — St. Petersburg, 1941. — P. 109.).

But is it possible to introduce war «methodically» without plans?

In fact, the work of the general is a constant and continuous planning, although the nature of war is just as constantly and continuously opposed to this planning. Only a commander who in this struggle will be able to defeat the nature of war can also count on victory over the enemy.

First of all, military planning requires great abstinence from the general. He must refrain from planning too much, must refrain from planning too far ahead, must finally refrain from prematurely accepting plans. One reason underlies these demands: the situation in war is constantly changing and no plan can foresee all changes.

In relation to his plans, the general must show the greatest flexibility and freedom of mind, never allow his mind to be bound and fettered by his own plans. And the best commanders, indeed, have always considered this. Suvorov, for example, “understood better than anyone else that perfectly drawn up campaign plans can only be partially executable, and sometimes they must completely change because they will be opposed by an enemy whose forces and methods cannot be accurately determined and who has his own intentions and goals. . Suvorov always took into consideration the case in the war ”(Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. — St. Petersburg, 1900. — P. 520.).

Foresight

“To manage is to foresee,” says the old adage. To foresee means, through the twilight of the unknown and the fluidity of the situation, to see the main meaning of the events taking place, to catch their main trend and, based on this, to understand where they are going. Foresight is the highest stage of that transformation of the complex into the simple, which … has already been discussed. Foresight is the result of deep penetration into the situation and comprehension of the main thing in it, decisive, that which determines the course of events.

All great commanders, to one degree or another, possessed the ability to foresee …

Kutuzov showed a rare ability to unravel the intentions of the enemy and predict the course of events more than once before, but only in the Patriotic War of 1812 did this side of his genius unfold in full.

Already in Tsarevo-Zaimishche, after a review of the army, he speaks of the Napoleonic army, which at that time was victoriously advancing: “And the French will also be. Believe my word… I will have horse meat.”

There is an opinion that Kutuzov gave the battle of Borodino against his will, only obeying the desire of the army and the whole country.

… Kutuzov’s behavior before and during the battle suggests that he attached exceptional importance and did everything possible to concentrate by this moment the material and strain the moral forces of the army to the utmost. Kutuzov described the Battle of Borodino as a battle in the full sense of the word, decisive. This is not how battles are given, which are looked upon as unnecessary and useless.

The great power of Kutuzov’s insight was reflected here, firstly, in the fact that he saw the moment when it was possible to fight a decisive battle with confidence in victory, and, secondly, in the fact that he understood the nature of the Battle of Borodino, understood that this — Delayed win. Therefore, he was not embarrassed by the lack of formal signs of a victorious end to the battle … Through the external course of events, which seemed unfavorable, he saw their inner meaning, which consisted in the fact that near Borodino he won a complete and decisive victory over Napoleon.

Orientation speed

In case of unforeseen changes in the situation, another most important property of the commander’s mind comes into force — the speed of orientation, considerations and decisions. All great commanders, of course, use both means of combating the «gloom» of the military situation: they strive to foresee as much as possible, and they are ready to respond to the unforeseen with the greatest speed.

No wonder Caesar was Suvorov’s favorite hero. In it, Suvorov was most impressed by speed: “Julius Caesar won by haste” (Mikhnevich N.P. Suvorov — strategist. — In the book: Suvorov in the reports of the professors of the Academy of the General Staff. — SP b., 1900. — P. 7.) .

CAESAR Gaius Julius (102 or 100-44 BC), Roman dictator in 49, 48-46, 45, from 44 — for life. Commander. Started polit. activity as a supporter of the rep. groupings, holding the positions of a military tribune in 73, an aedile in 65, a praetor in 62. Seeking a consulate, in 60 he entered into an alliance with G. Pompey and Crassus (1st triumvirate). Consul in 59, then governor of Gaul; in 58-51 years. subjugated all of transalpine Gaul to Rome. In 49, relying on the army, he began the struggle for autocracy. Having defeated Pompey and his supporters in 49-45. (Crassus died in 53), was at the head of the state. Having concentrated in his hands a number of the most important republican positions (dictator, consul, etc.), he became in fact a monarch. Killed in a Republican conspiracy. Author of Notes on the Gallic War and Notes on Civil Wars; reformed the calendar (Julian calendar). (Note auto-stat.)

Suvorov himself in his quality even surpassed the one whom he set himself as a model. Speed, swiftness, mobility (in all decisive manifestations) are Suvorov’s organic properties.

Let’s take the Rymnik case.

RYMNIK (Rimnic), r. in Romania, a tributary of the river. Siret (Seret). During the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791. under Rymnik, Russian and Austrian troops under command. A.V. Suvorov on September 11.9.1789, XNUMX defeated the Turkish army, for which Suvorov received the title of Count of Rymnik. (Note auto-stat.)

Having received news from the Austrian commander, Prince Coburg, that a huge Turkish army was approaching the Austrians, Suvorov wrote him one word in response on a piece of paper with a pencil: “I’m coming!” — and immediately, late at night, set out on a campaign. Walking along a washed-out road, in pouring rain, forced to build a bridge on the way, he traveled about 100 miles in two days. “There is a story: when a spy reported to the grand vizier about the appearance of Suvorov, the vizier ordered him to be hanged for spreading fables” (Osipov K.N. Suvorov. — M., 138. — P. 144.). Arriving at the place, Suvorov immediately, accompanied by several officers and a small party of Cossacks, goes to reconnaissance, climbs a tree, carefully inspects the fortress and immediately draws up a battle plan, a plan of extraordinary courage, which included a change of front in front of the enemy. He went back with a ready plan in his head ”(Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes. T.1. — SP b., 1884. — P. 213.).

The victory at Focsani is due to Suvorov’s ability to instantly navigate and make a decision in an unforeseen turn of affairs.

FOKSHANI, a city in Romania, in the region of which on July 21.7 (August 1.8), 1789, Russian-Austrian troops (over 17 thousand people) during the Russian-Turkish war of 1787 — 1791. defeated the Turkish troops of Osman Pasha (30 thousand people). The victory was achieved thanks to the skillful and decisive actions of A.V. Suvorov, who actually led the allied forces in the battle. (Note auto-stat.)

In the midst of the battle, he suddenly turns his column, with great difficulty leads it through the swamps and appears from the side where the Turks did not expect the Russians at all (Osipov K.N. Suvorov. — M., 138. — P. 142.).

The pinnacle of Suvorov’s swiftness was the Battle of Trebbia.

Trebbia (Trebbia), r. in Northern Italy. right tributary. By. 17 — 19.6.1799 Russian-Austrian troops led by A.V. Suvorov during the Italian campaign defeated the French troops of General J. MacDonald on Trebbia. (Note auto-stat.)

First of all, the famous march to Trebbia (80 miles in 36 hours!) … Some regiments did not go the last leg of the journey, but fled and immediately joined the battle. Suvorov himself, with four Cossack regiments, rushed forward and arrived on the battlefield at a time when the position of the Austrians of M. Melas was becoming hopeless. “He arrived just in time,” Melas told Miloradovich with tears in his eyes a few days later that he owed his salvation to the rapid arrival of the Russians. Actually, not Russians, but Suvorov; so few Russians arrived that there was still a large advantage on the side of the French, but this difference was replenished by the presence of Suvorov. The genius of war appeared in him, the spirit of victory flew in. Jumping up to the dais, he took a long, attentive look at the battlefield. It was at moments like these, when it came to his inimitable eye, that he was truly great. Two Cossack regiments, without having time to take a breath, flew to the right, into the flank of Dombrovsky with the Poles, and dragoons were sent against his front; the other two Cossack regiments rushed under the command of Suvorov’s nephew, Gorchakov, to threaten the right flank of the French. The French advance was delayed, and the Poles were completely confused. Success, of course, was minute, but in such cases every minute is precious. The head of the Russian avant-garde appeared on the road … (Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes — T.1. — SP b., 1884. — P. 581 — 582.) ”.

We are interested in … the ability to quickly understand a difficult situation and almost instantly find the right solution is called differently. Sometimes it is called intuition.

This concept, often conveyed in Russian translations as a true military eye or a true military look, is often found in the characteristics that Napoleon gave to military figures.

This expression was often used by Suvorov: “We don’t need methodism, but a correct military outlook” (Mikhnevich N.P. Suvorov — strategist. — In the book: Suvorov in the reports of professors of the Academy of the General Staff. — St. Petersburg, 1900. — S. 5.).

The psychological nature of the commander’s intuition is closely connected with the high development of spatial ideas and spatial thinking. The instantaneousness of understanding and decision in the act of intuition presupposes the visibility of thinking. In military affairs, this visibility means, first of all, the grasp of all spatial relationships with the mind’s eye, the ability to see on some imaginary map, scheme, plan, and the like, all possible combinations of actions in their relation to all essential features of the terrain.

An equally important role is played in the intuition of the commander and the sense of time. “In practice, the given time plays a huge role: a minute is missed, and the best measure can lead to disaster. War is a matter of tact and minute; often the loss of a minute is tantamount to the loss of the party ”(Dragomirov M.I. Eleven years. 1895 — 1905: Collection of original and translated articles. In 2 — x vol. — vol. 2. — SP b., 1909. — P. 445 — 446.).

The time factor is always of paramount importance in war. But sometimes his role is especially pronounced, so that the choice of the moment becomes central, in the full sense of the word, decisive.

… A striking example is the Kinburn battle, where Suvorov showed a wonderful sense of time, firstly, in determining the moment of the first counterattack, made just when the Turks stormed, and secondly, in choosing the moment to throw in battle all the reserves that he kept intact until the evening: putting them into action decided the fate of the battle and led to the complete extermination of the Turkish detachment.

KINBURN, a fortress on the Kinburn Spit (between the Dnieper and Yagorlytsky estuaries of the Black Sea). During the Russian-Turkish war of 1787-1791. the Turkish fleet landed troops (5 thousand people), which were defeated by the troops of A.V. Suvorov (about 4 thousand people).

Outstanding military education

It is not enough to say that a commander must be an intelligent person. To this we must add: the commander must be a highly educated person: he must have excellent military training and an outstanding general education.

Indeed, outstanding commanders, those who can not hesitate to be classified as great, were not just people «knowing a lot»: they usually stood at the highest levels of education of their time. Vivid examples are already provided by the ancient world. The greatest military leaders of antiquity were among the most cultured and educated people of their era. Alexander was a student (and not only nominally) of Aristotle, Hannibal was a highly educated person for that time, Caesar, finally, in terms of breadth of knowledge and brilliant culture of mind, stood in the forefront of the great people of the ancient world. Can this be understood as mere chance?

ALEXANDER THE MACEDONIAN (356-323 BC), king of Macedonia from 336. The son of King Philip II, was brought up by Aristotle. Having defeated the Persians at Granik (334), Issus (333), Gaugamela (331), he subjugated the kingdom of the Achaemenids, invaded Wed. Asia (329), conquered the lands up to the river. Indus, creating the largest world monarchy of antiquity. (Note aut.-stat.).

HANNIBAL (Hannibal) (247 or 246-183 BC), Carthaginian commander. Son of Hamilcar Barca. During the 2nd Punich. war (218-201) made the transition through the Alps, won victories at the river. Ticinus, Trebbia (218), near Lake Trasimene (217), at Cannae (216). In 202, at Zama (Northern Africa), Hannibal was defeated by the Romans. (Note auto-stat.)

To approach this issue a little deeper, let’s take a closer look at the two largest commanders of the XNUMXth — XNUMXth centuries: Suvorov and Napoleon.

Engagement in the sciences, constant concern for self-education, Suvorov considered the first duty of a military leader.

Once he received from Catherine II George of the 3rd degree for the assignment, at his discretion, to a more worthy one. He chose Lieutenant Colonel Curtis. The laying ceremony was carried out in a very solemn atmosphere, while pronouncing an instruction. “In conclusion of this instruction, the last condition necessary for the general was given: continuous self-education through reading” (Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. — St. Petersburg, 1900. — P. 299.).

Suvorov himself fulfilled this instruction with extraordinary zeal, and, moreover, throughout his life. Here are some relevant excerpts from his biography.

The period of soldier’s service (17 — 23 years). He persistently works on his education at home and in the classes of the cadet corps. “The time that his comrades spent on cards and wine, he spent on books” (Osipov K.N. Suvorov. — M, 1938. — P. 21.). “All his time, without the slightest exception, was spent in the service, attending classes in the cadet corps and in home scientific studies; he definitely hasn’t been anywhere else” (Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 volumes — V.1. — SP b., 1884. — P.5.). All the money that he managed to save up through austerity, he used to buy books.

The period of service as a lieutenant (23 — 25 years). “I used every free minute to continue my self-education” (Osipov K.N. Suvorov. — M, 1938. — P. 25.).

The period of long-term stay in the village in the mid-80s. (about 55 years). “I read a lot and at one time even had a reader on the salary. But this reading by no means had the significance of military-special knowledge; he was attracted by knowledge in general, in the sense of expanding his mental horizons ”(Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. — St. Petersburg, 1900. — P. 267.).

Service in Byrlad in 1790 (59 years old) — BYRLAD, a city in Eastern Romania .. “Most of Suvorov’s free time went to reading. With him was a German student or candidate, whom he met several years ago and took him as a reader. «Suvorov was insatiable, forcing Philip Ivanovich to read a lot and for a long time and almost did not give him rest, squabbling over every stop.» “Everything was read in different languages: newspapers, magazines, military memoirs, statistics; not only books, but also manuscripts were obtained for reading ”(Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. In 3 vols. Vol. 1. — SP b., 1884. — P. 372 — 373.).

Service in Finland in 1791 — 1792 (60 — 61 years). “Using his little leisure, Suvorov was engaged in reading in Finland; without reading he could not live. We don’t know if scientific works were in his hands at that time, but he read a lot of newspapers, as can be seen from his subscription for 1792 ”(Petrushevsky A.F. Generalissimo Prince Suvorov. — St. Petersburg, 1900. — S. 278.).

Polish War 1794 (aged 63). Relentless activity «did not prevent him from finding time for reading, mainly in the evenings, for which he had several books in his luggage, including a commentary by Julius Caesar, his favorite hero» (Ibid. — P. 318.).

Link in Konchansky (66 — 67 years). “Having become accustomed to mental studies from a young age, Suvorov, all the more, could not do without them in his solitude. He read a lot, but less than he would like, because his eyes hurt. There was a library in Konchanskoye; he replenished it from time to time ”(Ibid. — P. 501.).

In this respect there was no difference between Suvorov and Napoleon; the latter was also much occupied with his education, was the same passionate reader.

It is difficult to say what areas of knowledge Napoleon and Suvorov were not interested in. Their education was literally encyclopedic. Napoleon’s interest in mathematics (from childhood he showed outstanding mathematical abilities), geography, history, and in his youth also philosophy … Suvorov knew mathematics, geography, philosophy, and most of all history well. It is especially necessary to single out in the Russian commander the inclination and undoubted ability to study languages. He knew German, French, Italian, Polish, Finnish, Turkish, Arabic, Persian.

It is impossible not to note the features common to both Napoleon and Suvorov. Both of them were distinguished by extreme independence of mind, high criticality of thought. The following words, referring to Suvorov, may well be transferred to Napoleon: “Everything obtained through science was processed in him into something completely new, his own, reaching almost the denial of samples … He was not a borrower anywhere and in nothing, and even less an imitator ”(Ibid. — P. 748.).

But both of them had an extremely valuable ability: they were able to separate teaching from criticism. Before criticizing, processing, denying, they knew how to assimilate. Here is a remark about Suvorov at the age of 17-23 that we find in Petrushevsky: “The spirit of criticism is inherent in his mind, but he gave it free rein only later; now he was studying, and there was no room for criticism” (Ibid. — p. 6.). And here is what he writes about Napoleon Tarle: “In any case, the 16-year-old second lieutenant did not criticize so much as he studied.

TARLE Yevgeny Viktorovich (1874-1955), historian, author of works: «Napoleon», «Talleyrand», «Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia», «Crimean War» (vols. 1-2) and others. .)

This is also a fundamental feature of his mind: in any book, as well as in any person, he approached these initial years of his life with an avid and impatient desire to quickly and fully extract what he did not yet know and what could give food. his own thought” (Tarle E.V. Napoleon. — M., 1941. — P.11.).

Equally important is the inherent ability of both to rigorously and immediately systematize knowledge. “I believe Locke,” says Suvorov, “that memory is the pantry of the mind; but there are a lot of partitions in this pantry, and therefore it is necessary to put everything where it should be ”(Osipov K.N. Suvorov. — M., 1938. — P. 25.). Napoleon said that various affairs and various objects were stowed in his head in the same way that they could be stowed in a chest of drawers. “When I want to stop doing something, I close its box and open another case box; they do not mix, and one thing never constrains or tires me while I am busy with another. In the last words of Napoleon, not only the complete orderliness of his mental baggage is noted, but also the extreme ease of using it … A trait very important for the commander’s mind.