PSYchology
Jung K.G. Psychological types. M., 1924.

Introduction

Plato and Aristotle! These are not only two systems, but also types of two different human natures, which, from time immemorial, dressed in different attire, are more or less hostile to one another. They compete fiercely from the beginning of the Middle Ages to our time, and this struggle is the essential content of the church history of the first times. No matter what names history puts forward, it is always only about Plato and Aristotle. Dreamy, mystical, Platonic natures create Christian ideas and symbols corresponding to them from the recesses of their souls. Practical natures, putting everything in order, Aristotelian natures create from these ideas and symbols a solid system, dogma and cult. The Catholic Church, finally, encloses both natures in itself, some of which create a fortress for themselves from the clergy, and others from monasticism, but all the time they continue to fight with each other.

G. Heine. Germany.

In my practical medical practice with nervous patients, I noticed long ago that in addition to many individual differences in the human psyche, there is also a typical development, and above all two sharply different types, which I called the type of introversion and the type of extraversion.

Considering the course of human life, we see that the fate of one is determined primarily by the objects of his interests, while the fate of another is primarily determined by his own inner life, his subject. But since we all deviate to some extent in one direction or another, we are naturally disposed to understand everything in the sense of only our own type.

I mention this circumstance from the very beginning in order to prevent possible misunderstandings. Of course, this circumstance makes it much more difficult to attempt a general description of types. I must count on the great favor of my reader if I wish to be correctly understood. It would be relatively simple if each reader knew which category he or she belongs to. But it is often very difficult to decide whether someone belongs to one type or another, especially if the question is about oneself. Judgments about one’s own personality are always extremely unclear. These subjective obscurations of judgment are especially frequent because each pronounced type has a special tendency to compensate for the one-sidedness of its type, a tendency that is biologically expedient, since it tends to maintain mental balance. Through compensation, secondary characters or types arise, which present an image that is extremely difficult to decipher; the latter is all the more difficult because we ourselves are inclined to deny the existence of types altogether and recognize only individual differences.

I have to mention these difficulties in order to justify a well-known feature of my further presentation: it might seem that the simplest way would be to describe two specific cases and, after breaking them down, put them side by side. But each person has both mechanisms, extraversion and introversion, and only the relative predominance of one or the other determines the type. Therefore, it is necessary to apply a strong retouch in order to give the picture the necessary relief, which already leads to a more or less innocent forgery. To this it must be added that the psychological reaction of a person is such a complex subject that, with my abilities of exposition, I will hardly be able to fully give an absolutely correct picture of it. Therefore, I must necessarily confine myself to a presentation of the principles that I have abstracted from detailed individual observations. In this case, it is not a matter of deduction a priori, as it might seem, but of a deductive exposition of empirically acquired views. These views, I hope, will serve to clarify somewhat the dilemma which, not only in analytical psychology, but also in other branches of science, and especially in personal relations between people, has led and still leads to misunderstandings and dissensions. From this it becomes clear why the existence of two different types is actually a long-known fact, which in one form or another was noted either by a connoisseur of people, or by the painful reflection of a thinker or representative, for example, Goethe’s intuition, as the all-encompassing principle of systole and diastole. The terms and concepts, which were understood as the mechanism of introversion and extraversion, are very different and are always adapted to the point of view of an individual observer. Despite the difference in formulations, there is always something in common in the basic understanding, namely, the movement of interest towards the object in one case and the movement of interest from the object to the subject and to his own mental processes in the other case. In the first case, the object acts like a magnet on the tendencies of the subject, it attracts them and largely conditions the subject; it even alienates the subject from itself to such an extent, so changes its qualities in the sense of equating it with the object, that one might think that the object has a greater and ultimately decisive significance for the subject, that the complete subordination of the subject to the object is to a certain extent an absolute predestination and a special meaning. life of fate. In the second case, on the contrary, the subject is and remains the center of all interests. It can be said that one gets the impression that all vital energy is directed towards the subject and therefore always prevents the object from acquiring any influence on the subject. It seems as if the energy is escaping from the object, as if the subject is a magnet that wants to attract the object to itself.

It is difficult to characterize this opposite behavior in relation to the object in an easily understandable, clear way, and there is a great danger of arriving at completely paradoxical formulations that lead more to confusion than to clarity. The most generally introverted point of view could be defined as one that under all circumstances tries to put the personality and the subjective psychological phenomenon above the object and the objective phenomenon, or at least affirm them in relation to the object. This attitude, therefore, gives more value to the subject than to the object. Accordingly, the object is always at a lower level of value, it has a secondary significance, it is sometimes only an external objective sign of the subjective content, as if the embodiment of an idea, and, however, it is the idea that is essential; or he is the object of an emotion, and, however, the most important thing is an emotional experience, and not an object in its real individuality. The extraverted point of view, on the other hand, places the subject below the object, with the object having the predominant value. The subject always enjoys a secondary meaning, the subjective phenomenon sometimes seems to be only a disturbing and unnecessary appendage to what is objectively happening. It is clear that psychology, starting from these opposite points of view, must break up into two completely different orientations. One considers everything from the point of view of its understanding, and the other — from the point of view of what is objectively happening.

These opposite attitudes are first of all only opposite mechanisms: diastolic movement towards the object and perception of the object, systolic concentration and separation of energy from the perceived object. Each person possesses both mechanisms as an expression of his natural life rhythm, which Goethe, of course, did not accidentally designate with physiological concepts that characterize the activity of the heart. The rhythmic change of both forms of mental activity should have corresponded to the normal course of life. The complex external conditions under which we live, and perhaps even more complex conditions of our individual mental disposition, rarely, however, allow a completely undisturbed course of mental activity. External circumstances and internal dispositions very often favor one mechanism and limit and hinder another. From this naturally occurs the preponderance of one mechanism. If this state somehow becomes chronic, then as a result of this a type arises, that is, a habitual attitude in which one mechanism constantly dominates, without, of course, being able to completely suppress the other, since it necessarily belongs to mental activity. life. Therefore, a pure type can never exist in the sense that it completely owns one mechanism while the other is completely atrophied. A typical setup always means only the relative predominance of one mechanism.

By stating introversion and extraversion, for the first time, it was possible to distinguish between two large groups of psychological individuals. But all the same, these groupings are of such a superficial and general nature that they allow only such a general distinction. A more precise study of the psychology of those individuals who belong to one group or another immediately shows great differences between individual individuals who, in spite of this, belong to the same group. Therefore, we must take one more step to be able to determine where the differences of individuals belonging to the same group come from. My experience has shown me that individuals can be distinguished in the most general way, not only by the universal distinction between extraversion and introversion, but also by certain basic psychological functions. And just as external circumstances and internal dispositions bring about the dominance of extraversion and introversion, they also favor the dominance of a certain basic function in the individual. The main functions, i.e. functions that are significantly different from other functions, are, in my experience, thinking, emotions, sensation, and intuition. If one of these functions habitually dominates, then the corresponding type appears. Therefore, I distinguish between thinking, emotional, sensory and intuitive types. Each of these types, moreover, can be introverted or extroverted, depending on their behavior towards the object, as described above. In my two preliminary reports on psychological types, I did not adhere to the distinction outlined here, but identified the thinking type with the introverted and the emotional type with the extraverted. This confusion turned out to be inconsistent with a deeper processing of the problem. To avoid misunderstanding, I would therefore ask the reader to bear in mind the distinction made here. In order to provide the necessary clarity on such complex issues, I have devoted the last chapter of this book to defining my psychological concepts.

General description of types

A. Introduction

I want to try to give a general description of type psychology. This must be done first for both general types, which I have labeled introverted and extroverted. Then, in addition, I will try to give some more characterization of those special types, the originality of which is determined by the fact that the individual adapts and orients himself mainly through the function that is most developed in him. I would designate the former as general attitude-dependent types, differing from each other in the direction of their interests and the movement of their libido, and the latter as functional types.

General setting-dependent types are distinguished by their peculiar setting with respect to an object. The introvert relates to the object in an abstract way, he, taken at his base, is always concerned with taking away the libido from the object, as if he were to prevent the predominance of the object. Extroverted, on the contrary, has a positive attitude towards the object. He affirms the meaning of the object by the fact that he constantly orients his subjective attitude towards the object and relates it to it. The object taken as a foundation never has sufficient value for it, and therefore its value must be increased. Both types are so different, their opposition is so clear, that their existence becomes obvious even to the layman in psychology, if one ever pays attention to it. Everyone knows those closed, hard to comprehend, often shy natures who are the strongest contrast to others — open, courteous, often cheerful or at least friendly and accessible characters who get along with everyone or even argue, they are still in a relationship. allowing everyone to be influenced or allowed to be influenced by them. Usually such differences are considered only as individual cases of a peculiar stock of character. But whoever has had the opportunity to study many people thoroughly will easily discover that, in this contrast, it is not at all about isolated individual cases, but rather about typical attitudes, which are much more general than limited psychological experience would suggest. In fact, it is a matter of a basic opposition, which is more or less distinct, but always noticeable in individuals with a personality expressed to a certain extent. We meet such people not only among the educated, but in general in all strata of the population, as a result of which our types can be found both among the workers and peasants, and among the highly differentiated people of any nation. In the same way, gender differences do not change anything in this fact. All women show the same opposites. Such a large distribution could hardly have taken place if it were an act of consciousness, i.e., an act of consciousness. e. about a conscious and intentionally chosen attitude. In this case, of course, a certain class of the population, associated with the same upbringing and education, and accordingly, a spatially limited class of the population would be the predominant carrier of such an attitude. The case, however, is not at all like this, but quite the opposite — types are separated explicitly indiscriminately. In the same family, one child is introverted and the other is extroverted. Since, according to these facts, the attitude-dependent type, as a general and apparently random phenomenon, cannot be the result of a conscious judgment or a conscious intention, it must owe its existence to an unconscious, instinctive basis.

The relationship between subject and object, considered biologically, is always an adaptation, since any relationship between subject and object presupposes changing effects of one on the other. These changes constitute adaptation. Typical attitudes towards an object are therefore adjustment processes. Nature knows two, fundamentally different, ways of adaptation and the possibility of the permanent existence of a living organism due to this: one way is increased fertility with a relatively lower strength of protection and life expectancy of an individual, the second way is the supply of an individual with diverse means of self-preservation with a relatively lower fertility. This biological opposition, it seems to me, is not only an analogy, but also the common basis of our two psychological modes of adaptation. Here I could confine myself to a general indication, on the one hand, of the property of the extraverted to constantly waste himself and spread himself in everything, and, on the other hand, to the tendency of the introverted to protect himself from external influences, to refrain as far as possible from any expenditure of energy that relate directly to the object, in order to create for himself the most secured and strong position possible. Therefore, Black intuitively well designated both types as profilic (fertile) and devouring type (gluttonous type). As general biology shows, both paths are possible and successful in their own way; the same can be said for typical installations. What one achieves by mass relations, the other achieves by monopoly.

The fact that sometimes even children in the first years of life accurately detect a typical attitude suggests that it is not the struggle for existence, as it is usually understood, that forces a certain attitude. Of course, it could be argued with sufficient grounds that a small child and even a nursing infant should already have done the psychological work of adapting an unconscious character, since the peculiarity of maternal influence in particular leads to specific reactions in children. This argument can refer to indisputable facts, but becomes, however, shaky if one mentions the also indisputable fact that two children of the same mother can already very early be assigned to opposite types, and not the slightest change in the attitude of the mother can be proved. . Although I do not in any way want to underestimate the infinite possibility of parental influence, nevertheless this experience leads me to the conclusion that the decisive factor must be sought in the predisposition of the child. Finally, it is precisely to individual disposition that one must attribute the fact that, under the most identical external conditions possible, one child forms one type, and the other another type. By this, of course, I mean only those cases that are under normal conditions. Under abnormal conditions, i.e., where it is a question of extremely strong and at the same time abnormal attitudes in mothers, a relatively uniform attitude can be imposed on children by violence against their individual predisposition, which, perhaps, would have chosen a different type if it were not for abnormal external conditions prevented this. Where there is such an externally influenced perversion of the type, the individual subsequently becomes for the most part neurotic, and his cure is possible only through the identification of an attitude naturally corresponding to the individual.

As regards peculiar disposition, I can only say of this that there are obviously individuals who have greater ease or ability, or who adapt themselves more usefully in one way than in another. To do this, it would be necessary to raise the question of the last physiological foundations that are inaccessible to our knowledge. That such grounds are possible seems to me probable from experience, which shows that a change in type under certain circumstances is very detrimental to the physiological well-being of the organism, and is often the cause of great emaciation.

B. Extroverted type

For brevity and clarity of presentation, it is necessary to separate the psychology of the conscious from the psychology of the unconscious when describing this and subsequent types. We therefore turn first to the description of the phenomena of consciousness.

I. General attitude of consciousness

As you know, everyone is guided by the data that the outside world delivers to him; but we see that this can happen in a more or less decisive way. One, due to the fact that it is cold outside, considers it necessary to put on a coat, the other finds it superfluous for the purpose of his hardening; one admires the new tenor because everyone admires him; the other does not admire him, not because he does not like him, but because he is of the opinion that what everyone admires is far from worthy of admiration; one submits to these relations, because, as experience shows, nothing else is possible, while the other is convinced that if it has already happened a thousand times, then the thousand and first time it can happen differently and in a new way, etc. The first is guided by these external facts, the second remains with the opinion that comes between him and the objectively given. When the orientation to the object or to objective data outweighs to the extent that the most frequent and most important decisions and actions are due not to subjective views, but to objective relations, then one speaks of an extraverted type. When someone thinks, feels and acts in such a way, in a word, lives in such a way that directly corresponds to objective relations and their requirements, in a good or bad sense, then he is an extrovert. He lives in such a way that the object as a determining quantity obviously plays a greater role in his mind than his subjective opinion. Of course, he has subjective views, but their determining power is less than the power of external objective conditions. Therefore, he never thinks to meet any unconditional factor within himself, since such factors are known to him only outside him. Like Epimetheus, his soul submits to external demands, not without a struggle, of course; but the matter always ends in favor of external conditions. His entire consciousness looks outward, since the main and decisive determination always comes to him from outside. From this basic attitude follow, so to speak, all the features of his psychology, unless they are based on the primacy of a certain psychological function or on individual characteristics.

Interest and attention follow objective events, and above all those that closely surround him. Not only faces, but also things attract interest. Accordingly, actions are based on the influence of persons and things. They are directly conditioned by objective data and determining factors, and from them, so to speak, are exhaustively explicable. Actions are clearly conditioned by objective circumstances. Even if actions are not a simple reaction to environmental stimuli, they nevertheless have the character of application to real relations and find sufficient and appropriate scope within the framework of the objectively given. They are completely devoid of serious tendencies to go beyond these limits. The same applies to interests: objective events are an inexhaustible source of irritation, so that interest does not normally require anything else. The moral laws of actions are covered by the corresponding requirements of society resp. prevailing moral concepts. If the prevailing views were different, then the subjective moral guiding tendencies would also be different, without anything changing in the general psychological habitus. This strict conditioning by objective factors does not mean, as it might seem, complete or even ideal adaptation to the conditions of life. Of course, to an extraverted view, such an application must appear to be a complete adaptation, since no other criterion is given to such a view. But the highest point of view does not yet say that what is objectively given is normal under all circumstances. Objective conditions may be historically or spatially abnormal. The individual who is applied to these relations, although imitating the abnormal character of the environment, is at the same time, together with everything around him, in an abnormal position in relation to the universally binding laws of life. A single person can, of course, flourish at the same time, but only until he and everything around him perish for transgressions against the general laws of life. He must take part in this death with the same fidelity with which he previously applied to objective data. It has an application, but not an adaptation, since adaptation requires more than frictionless adherence to any conditions of the immediate environment (I refer to Epimetheus Spiteler) (Spitteler). It requires the observance of those laws that are more general than local and historical conditions. A simple application is a limitation of the normal extraverted type. The extraverted type owes its normality, on the one hand, to the circumstance that it applies relatively without friction to given relations and, naturally, has no other claims than the fulfillment of objectively given possibilities, for example, to choose I, a profession that in a given place and in this time presents promising opportunities, either to do or produce what the environment currently needs and expects from him, or to refrain from all innovations, unless they already suggest themselves, or otherwise exceed the expectations of the environment . But, on the other hand, his normality is also based on the important circumstance that the extravert takes into account the reality of his subjective needs and needs. His weak point lies precisely in this, that the tendency of his type is directed outward to such an extent that of all subjective facts, even the most connected with feelings, namely bodily health, as too little objective, as too little «external», is not sufficiently taken into account. , so that the satisfaction of elementary needs necessary for physical well-being no longer takes place. As a result, the body suffers, not to mention the soul. The extrovert usually notices little of this last circumstance, but it is all the more noticeable to those close to him at home.

This tangible fact cannot be overlooked. Naturally, he regards it as concrete and «objective,» since he has nothing else to characterize his own mentality. In others, he immediately notices «imagination.» An attitude that is too extroverted may disregard the subject to such an extent that the latter may be completely sacrificed to so-called objective requirements, for example, the constant expansion of the enterprise, just because there are orders and that it is necessary to fulfill the opportunities that present themselves.

The danger of the extrovert is that he is drawn into objects and completely lost in them. The functional (nervous) or actual bodily disorders resulting from this have a compensatory value, since they force the subject to involuntary self-restraint. If the symptoms are functional, then their characteristics can symbolically express the psychological situation, for example, in a singer whose fame quickly reaches a dangerous height, requiring a disproportionate expenditure of energy from him, due to a nervous delay, high tones suddenly disappear. A person who, having started very modestly, quickly reaches an influential and promising social position, psychogenically develops all the symptoms of altitude sickness. A man who intends to marry a woman of a very dubious character, whom he idolizes and greatly overestimates, falls ill with spasms of the throat, forcing him to limit himself to two cups of milk a day, each of which he must drink for three hours. This greatly hinders him from visiting his bride, and he can only attend to nourishing his body. A person who has not grown up to hard work in an enterprise that has grown extraordinarily due to his own merits, has nervous attacks of thirst, as a result of which he soon falls ill with nervous alcoholism. It seems to me that hysteria is the most common neurosis of the extraverted type. The classic hysterical case is always characterized by excessive intercourse with surrounding persons; a characteristic feature is also directly imitative application to circumstances. The main feature of the hysterical character is a constant tendency to be interesting and impress others. Correlative to this is the proverbial suggestibility, accessibility to the influence of others. Explicit extraversion is manifested in hysterics and in sociability, which sometimes reaches stories of purely fantastic content, from which accusations of hysterical lies come. The hysterical character is first of all an exaggeration of the normal attitude; but then it becomes more complicated on the part of the unconscious by compensatory reactions, which, through bodily disorders, force extraversion, which is exaggerated against psychic energy, into introversion. Through the reactions of the unconscious, another category of symptoms arises, which are of a more introverted character. First of all, this includes the painfully heightened activity of fantasy. After this general characterization of the extraverted attitude, let us now turn to a description of the changes that take place in basic psychological functions due to the extraverted attitude.

II. Installation of the unconscious

It may seem strange that I speak of the «setting of the unconscious.» As I have sufficiently explained, I think of the relation of the unconscious to the conscious as compensatory. According to this view, the unconscious can have an attitude just as much as the conscious.

In the previous chapter I mentioned the tendency of the extraverted attitude towards a certain one-sidedness, namely, the pre-eminence of the objective factor during the mental act. The extraverted type is always tempted to (supposedly) sacrifice himself to the object, to assimilate his subject with the object. I have exhaustively pointed out the consequences that can result from an exaggeration of the extraverted attitude, namely, the harmful suppression of the subjective factor. Therefore, one should expect that psychic compensation to the conscious extraverted attitude will especially emphasize the subjective moment, i.e. e. we will have to prove a strong egocentric tendency in the unconscious. Indeed, this proof was fortunate in the sense of facts in practical experience. Here I do not go into casuistry, but refer to the following chapters, where I try to depict the characteristic attitude of the unconscious in each functional type. Since this chapter deals only with the compensation of the general extroverted attitude, I confine myself to a general characterization of the compensatory attitude of the unconscious. The attitude of the unconscious to actually supplement the conscious extraverted attitude has the property of an introverted character. It concentrates energy on the subjective moment, i.e. e. on all needs and urges that are suppressed or repressed by a too extroverted conscious attitude. It is easy to understand, as it should have been clear from the previous chapter, that the orientation to the object and to the objectively given violates the multitude of subjective impulses, opinions, desires and needs and deprives them of the energy that should naturally belong to them. Man is not a machine, which in each given case can be rebuilt for a completely different purpose, and which then, in a completely different way, will function just as correctly as before. Man always carries with him his whole history and the history of mankind. But the historical factor expresses a vital need that a wise economy must meet. Everything that has been up to now must somehow be reflected in the new and become accustomed to it. Therefore, complete assimilation with the object meets with protest already before the former and existing from the very beginning. From this very general reasoning, it is easy to understand why the unconscious demands of the extraverted type have a properly primitive and infantile, egoistic character. When Freud says of the unconscious that it can «only desire,» this is largely referring to the unconscious extraverted type. Application to the objectively given and assimilation with it interfere with the awareness of the missing subjective impulses. These tendencies (thoughts, desires, affects, needs, feelings, etc.) e.) take on the degree of their displacement, regressive character, i.e. e. the less they are realized, the more they become infantile and archaic. The conscious attitude deprives them of that distribution of energy which they can relatively dispose of, and leaves them only that energy which it cannot take away. This remnant, whose power must not be underestimated, is what must be designated as the original instinct. Instinct cannot be changed by the arbitrary actions of an individual; on the contrary, this would require a slow organic change of many generations, since instinct is the energetic expression of a certain organic inclination. Thus every repressed tendency ends up with a considerable amount of energy left, which corresponds to the strength of the instinct; this tendency retains its validity, even though it has become unconscious through deprivation of energy. The more complete the conscious extraverted attitude, the more infantile and archaic the unconscious attitude. A gooey egotism that is much more than childish and borders on villainous sometimes characterizes the unconscious attitude. Here we find in full bloom those incestuous desires that Freud describes. It goes without saying that these things are completely unconscious and remain also hidden from the eyes of the inexperienced observer until the extroverted conscious attitude reaches a higher degree. But if there is an exaggeration of the conscious point of view, then the unconscious also appears symptomatically, i.e. e. unconscious egoism, infantilism and archaism lose their original compensatory character when they become more or less openly opposed to the conscious attitude. This manifests itself primarily in an absurd exaggeration of the conscious point of view, which should serve to suppress the unconscious, but which usually ends in the reductio ad absurdum of the conscious attitude, i.e. e. crash. The catastrophe can be objective, since objective goals were gradually distorted into subjective ones. Thus, for example, one printer, thanks to twenty years of hard and long work, turned from a simple employee into an independent owner of a significant enterprise. The enterprise expanded more and more, he was more and more involved in it, while all side interests were dissolved in this business. This consumed him and led to his death in the following way: in compensation for his exclusively business interests, some memories from his childhood came to life, and it was then that he found great pleasure in painting and drawing. Instead of using this ability as a compensatory side activity, he brought it into his enterprise and began to fantasize about the «artistic» execution of his works. Unfortunately, fantasies have become reality; he really began to produce according to his own primitive and infantile taste with such success that in a few years his enterprise perished. He acted according to our «cultural ideal», according to which an energetic person should concentrate everything on the ultimate goal.

But the catastrophic denouement can also be of a subjective kind, in the form of a nervous shock. The latter is always due to the fact that unconscious opposition is finally able to paralyze conscious action. In this case, the demands of the unconscious are categorically imposed on the conscious and this causes a disastrous split, which for the most part results in the fact that people either no longer know what they really want, have no desire for anything, or immediately want too much, have too much hunting, but to what is impossible. The necessary, often culturally necessary suppression of infantile and primitive needs easily leads to neurosis or to the abuse of drugs such as alcohol, morphine, cocaine, etc. etc. In even more severe cases, the bifurcation ends in suicide. The outstanding property of unconscious tendencies is that, just as they are deprived of their energy by conscious non-recognition, they take on a destructive character as soon as they cease to be compensatory. They cease to act compensatory when they reach a state corresponding to a cultural level that is absolutely incompatible with our level. From that moment on, unconscious tendencies form a block, in every respect opposite to the conscious attitude, the existence of which leads to open conflict. The fact that the attitude of the unconscious compensates for the attitude of consciousness is usually expressed in psychic equilibrium. A normal extraverted attitude does not mean, of course, that the individual always and everywhere acts according to the extraverted scheme. Under all circumstances, in the same individual, mental processes can be observed in which the question of the mechanism of introversion arises. Extroverted we call only that habitus in which the mechanism of extraversion outweighs. In this case, the most differentiated function is constantly being extraverted, while the less differentiated functions are in introverted use, i.e. e. the more complete function is the most conscious and subject to the control of consciousness and conscious intention, while the less differentiated functions are also less conscious, resp. partly unconscious and to a much lesser extent subject to the conscious will. The more complete function is always the expression of the conscious person, his intention, his will, his actions, while the less differentiated functions refer to what happens to the person. These may not be direct lapsus linguae or calami or other slips, but they may come from half or three-quarters of the intentions, since less differentiated functions also have less consciousness. The classic example of this is the extroverted emotional type, who enjoys excellent relationships with those around him, but who sometimes happens to make judgments of unparalleled faux pas.

The less differentiated functions in the extraverted attitude always show an exclusive subjective dependence on a strongly pronounced egocentrism and personal predilection, in which they reveal their close connection with the unconscious. In them, the unconscious constantly comes to light. In general, one should not imagine that the unconscious always lies buried under one or another number of layers and in some way can only be discovered through careful excavation. The unconscious, on the contrary, constantly flows into conscious psychological processes, and even to such a high extent that it is sometimes difficult for the observer to decide which character traits should be attributed to the conscious personality and which to the unconscious. This difficulty is chiefly with persons who are somewhat richer in appearance than others. Of course, much still depends on the attitude of the observer, whether he grasps rather the conscious or unconscious character of the personality. In general, the rationally established observer will sooner grasp the conscious character, while the perceptually established observer is more influenced by the unconscious character, since our judgment is more interested in the conscious motivation of the psychic process, while perception registers the mere event. But since we use perception and judgment equally, it can easily happen that a person appears to us at the same time introverted and extroverted, so that we are unable to indicate more precisely to which attitude the more complete function belongs. In such cases, only a thorough analysis of the properties of the function can help a correct understanding. At the same time, it is necessary to pay attention to which functions are completely subordinate to the control and motivation of consciousness, and which functions have the character of a random and spontaneous one. The former functions are always more highly differentiated than the latter, which, moreover, have somewhat infantile and primitive properties. As a rule, the former functions give the impression of being normal, while the latter have something abnormal or pathological in them.

C. Introverted type

I. General attitude of consciousness

As I already stated in chapters A, I, the introverted type differs from the extraverted type in that it predominantly focuses not on the object and objectively given as an extraverted type, but on subjective factors. In the aforementioned chapter, I showed, among other things, that in the introvert, between the perception of the object and his own actions, a subjective look intervenes, which prevents the actions from assuming a corresponding objective given character. This is, of course, a special case, which is given by way of example only and should serve as a simple illustrative explanation. Here, of course, we must look for more general formulations.

Although the introverted consciousness sees external conditions, it chooses subjective determinants as decisive. This type is therefore guided by that factor of perception and cognition which shows a subjective predisposition to eliminate irritations of the sense organs. Two faces, for example, see the same object, but they do not see it in such a way that both pictures obtained from this are absolutely identical. In addition to the different acuteness of the sense organs and personal equation, there are often profound differences in the kind and extent of the psychic assimilation of the perceived image. Whereas the extraverted type always prefers to be based on what he receives from the object, the introverted type prefers to rely on what in the subject constellates the external impression. In an individual case of apperception, the difference can, of course, be very subtle, but in the whole psychological structure it is very noticeable and precisely in the form of a reserve of personality (Reservates des ich). Let me explain this: I think that the view that, according to Wininger (Winibger), one could call this attitude philautic, or, in other words, autoerotic, egocentric, subjectivistic or egoistic, is in its principle misleading and deprives it of concept of value. It corresponds to the prejudice in favor of the extraverted attitude against the essence of the introverted. It must never be forgotten — an extraverted way of thinking forgets this too easily — that all perception and knowledge is not only objectively conditioned, but also subjectively. The world exists not only in itself, an and fur sich, but also as it seems to me. Yes, we, strictly speaking, do not even have a criterion for a judgment about the world that is not assimilated with the subject. To overlook the subjective factor is to deny the existence of a great doubt about the possibility of absolute knowledge. By overestimating the objective possibility of cognition, we suppress the significance of the subjective factor, the significance of the mere subject. But what is a subject? The subject is the person, we are the subject. It should not be forgotten that knowledge has a subject and that «knowledge in general» does not exist, and therefore for us there is no world where no one says: «I know», by which he already expresses the subjective limitation of all knowledge. The same applies to all mental functions: they have a subject that is just as necessary as an object. It is characteristic of our modern extroverted appraisal that the word «subjectively» usually sounds almost like a censure, at any rate «only subjectively» means a dangerous weapon designed to defeat someone who is not completely convinced of the necessary superiority of the object. Therefore, we must clearly understand what is meant by the expression «subjective» in this study. I call the subjective factor that psychological action (Aktion) or reaction which, combined with the influence of the object, produces a new mental fact. But since the subjective factor has remained to a very high degree identical to itself since the most ancient times and among all the peoples of the earth — since the elementary perceptions and cognitions, so to speak, are always and everywhere the same — it is just as firmly established reality, like an external object. If it were otherwise, then it would be impossible to speak of a constant and essentially unchanging reality, and agreement with traditions would be impossible. The subjective factor is therefore something as inexorably given as the extent of the sea and the radius of the earth. In this respect, the subjective factor belongs to all the importance of the world-determining quantity, which can never and nowhere be discounted. It is another universal law, and whoever bases on it, bases himself with the same certainty, with the same firmness and reality, as the one who refers to the object. But just as the object and the objectively given never remain the same, since it is subject to friction and chance, so the subjective factor is subject to variability and individual chance. And therefore its value is only relative. The excessive development of the introverted point of view in consciousness leads not to a better and more correct application of the subjective factor, but to an artificial subjectification of consciousness, which cannot but be reproached for being «only subjective.» This results in the opposite of the desubjectification of consciousness into an exaggerated extroverted attitude, which deserves Weiningger’s name «mizavetic». Since the introverted attitude rests on a ubiquitous, highly real, and absolutely necessary condition of psychological adjustment, expressions such as «philautic,» «egocentric,» and the like are inappropriate and reprehensible, rather because they arouse the suspicion that always goes just everything about the same ya There is nothing more false than such an assumption. But it often occurs in the study of judgments of extraverted personalities about introverted ones. I would not attribute this error to a single extraverted type, but rather to the current dominant extraverted view, which is not limited to the extraverted type, but is equally represented by another type, largely in spite of itself.

The introverted attitude is normally applied in principle to the hereditary-given psychological structure, which is the quantity inherent in the subject. But it is by no means to be taken as simply identical with the conscious personality of the subject, as would have happened with the designations mentioned above, but it is the psychological structure of the subject, prior to any development of the conscious personality (eines Ich). The real basic subject, namely the personality as a whole (das Selbst), is much more extensive than the conscious personality (das Ich), since the former also embraces the unconscious, while the latter is essentially the center of consciousness. If the conscious personality were identical with the personality as a whole, then it would be inconceivable that we should appear in dreams in completely different forms and meanings. In any case, the characteristic property of the introverted is that, following as much his own inclination as the general prejudice, he confuses his conscious personality with his personality as a whole and raises his conscious personality into the subject of a psychological process, which he does just that previously mentioned morbid subjectification of one’s consciousness, which alienates the object from it. The psychological structure is the same as what Semon called opinion and I called the collective unconscious. The individual personality as a whole is a part, or a slice, or a representative everywhere in every living being, of a feature of the psychological process that exists and is at the appropriate stage, which must be newly innate in every being. An innate feature of the mode of action has long been called instinct, I proposed to designate the feature of mental comprehension of an object as an archetype. What is to be understood by instinct, I may suppose known. The situation is different with the archetype. I mean by this the very thing that I, relying on Burckhardt (Jacob Burckhard), earlier designated as the «primitive image» and described in the appendix to this work. An archetype is a symbolic formula that everywhere enters into a function where either there are no conscious concepts, or where, for internal or external reasons, such concepts are generally impossible. The contents of the collective unconscious are represented in consciousness by clearly expressed inclinations and views. The individual usually believes — essentially wrongly — that they are due to the object, since they come from the unconscious structure of the soul (psyche) and are only brought to light by the influence of the object. These subjective tendencies and views are stronger than the influence of the object, their psychic value is higher, so that they cover all impressions. Just as it seems incomprehensible to the introverted that the object must always play a decisive role, so it remains a mystery to the extraverted how the subjective point of view can be stronger than the objective situation. He inevitably comes to the conclusion that an introverted or self-important egoist, or a doctrinaire fanatic. He would soon come to the hypothesis that the introvert is under the influence of an unconscious power complex. This prejudice is no doubt aided by the introvert in that his definite and highly generalized mode of expression, which seems to exclude all other opinion from the outset, aids the extravert’s prejudice. In addition, the mere decisiveness and inflexibility of the subjective judgment, which a priori stands above all objectively given, may already be sufficient to give the impression of strong egocentricity.

demanding premises of his subjective judgment or about his subjective perceptions. According to the style of his time, he seeks outside his consciousness, and not behind it. If he has a slight neurosis, then this means a more or less complete identity of the conscious personality with the personality as a whole, as a result of which the personality as a whole in its meaning is reduced to zero, and the conscious personality, on the contrary, is boundlessly inflated. The undoubted, world-determining force of the subjective factor is then squeezed into the conscious personality, resulting in disproportionate claims to power and the same ridiculous egocentrism. That psychology, which reduces the essence of man to an unconscious desire for power, was born from this beginning. Many of Nietzsche’s bad tastes, for example, owe their existence to the subjectivization of consciousness.

II. Installation of the unconscious

The predominant position of the subjective factor in consciousness means the inferiority of the objective factor. The object does not have the value it really should have. Just as in the extraverted attitude it plays too much of a role, so in the introverted attitude it has too little significance. To the extent that the consciousness of the introverted is subjectivized and gives the conscious personality an inappropriate significance, a position is taken towards the object, which in time turns out to be very shaky. The object is the magnitude of an undoubted force, while the conscious person is something very limited and unstable. Things would be different if the personality as a whole were opposed to the object. The personality as a whole and the world are commensurate quantities, so that the normal introverted attitude is just as suitable for testing being as the normal extraverted attitude. But if a conscious person seeks to give himself the significance of a subject, then naturally, as a compensation, an unconscious strengthening of the influence of the object occurs. This change manifests itself in the fact that the sometimes mere convulsive effort to ensure the superiority of the conscious personality is extremely strongly influenced by the object and the objectively given, which is all the more irresistible in that it takes possession of the individual unconsciously, and due to this they are imposed on consciousness without any opposition. Due to the wrong relation of the conscious personality to the object — the desire for domination is not adaptation — a compensatory relation to the object arises in the unconscious, which manifests itself in consciousness as a necessary and irresistible connection with the object. The more a conscious person tries to secure all kinds of freedom for himself, the more he falls into the slavery of the objectively given. Freedom of the spirit is tied to the goal of shameful financial dependence, independence of action from time to time makes a timid retreat before public opinion, moral superiority falls into the quagmire of inferior relationships, the desire for dominance ends in a sad longing for love, the unconscious first of all establishes a relationship to the object, namely this kind and an image that tends to radically destroy the illusion of power and the fantasy of the superiority of consciousness. The object, despite the conscious reduction, takes on terrible dimensions. As a result, the conscious personality tries even more to separate and overcome the object. In the end, the conscious person surrounds himself with a formal system of safeguards (as Adler rightly portrayed) that try to justify at least the specter of superiority. By this, however, the introvert completely separates himself from the object and completely torments himself, on the one hand, with measures of protection, and on the other, with fruitless attempts to impress the object and defend himself. But these efforts are always thwarted by the overcoming impressions he receives from the object. Against his will, the object constantly impresses him, it arouses in him the most unpleasant and prolonged affects, and pursues him step by step. He always needs a huge inner work in order to be able to «restrain himself.»

An analysis of the personal unconscious reveals a large number of power fantasies, coupled with fear of forcibly animated objects, of which the introvert does indeed easily fall prey. Namely, from the fear of the object, a kind of cowardice develops to express himself or express his opinion, since he is afraid of the increased influence of the object. He is afraid of strongly influencing affects in others and can hardly get rid of the fear of being influenced by others. Objects for him have powerful fearsome qualities, which, although he cannot notice consciously, he thinks he perceives with his unconscious. Since his conscious relation to the object is relatively suppressed, it goes through the unconscious, where it is endowed with the qualities of the unconscious. These qualities are primarily infantile-archaic. As a result, his relation to the object becomes primitive and takes on all those properties that characterize the primitive relation to the object. It is then that the object seems to have magical powers. Foreign new objects arouse fear and distrust, as if they hide unknown dangers, long-familiar objects are connected to his soul as if by invisible threads, each change is a hindrance, if not downright dangerous, since it means, it seems, a magical revivification of the object. A lonely island, on which only what is allowed to move, becomes an ideal. F. Th. Vise her’s novel «Auch Einer» perfectly shows this side of the introverted state of the soul, together with the hidden symbolism of the collective unconscious, which I leave aside in this description of types, since it belongs not only to the type, but is universal.

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